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ABSTRACT
Heterogeneous Beliefs, Collateralization, and Transactions
in General Equilibrium. (August 2011)
Xu Hu, B.B.A., The University of Science and Technology of China
Co–Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Leonardo Auernheimer
Dr. Rajiv Sarin
This study includes two theoretical works. In both works, I assume that economic
agents have heterogeneous beliefs. I study collateralized loan transactions among
economic agents arising from the divergent beliefs. Moreover, I make collateral re-
quirements endogenously determined, along with interest rates and loan quantities.
The theme of the first work is to study private transactions in currency crises.
I assume that domestic residents have different beliefs on how resilient the central
bank is in defending the currency. Due to the different beliefs, domestic residents
willingly borrow and lend among themselves. I show that the heterogeneity of beliefs
per se brings stability to the system, but that short-term collateralized loans among
domestic residents arising from the divergent opinions make an exchange rate peg
vulnerable.
The second work is to understand credit default swaps in general equilibrium.
The model features a market for a risky asset, a market for loans collateralized by the
risky asset, and a market for credit default swaps referencing these loans. I show that
the introduction of credit default swaps only as insurance has no effect on the price of
the risky asset. And the introduction of credit default swaps both as insurance and
as tools for making side bets depresses the price of the risky asset in general but has
no effect when the majority of the economy hold bearish views on the risky asset.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study includes two theoretical works. They are unrelated in the subject matter,
but they share several similarities from the modeling perspective. In both works, I
assume that economic agents have heterogeneous beliefs. I study collateralized loan
transactions among economic agents arising from divergent beliefs. Moreover, I make
collateral requirements endogenously determined in the market for loans, along with
interest rates and loan quantities. The first work is to study transactions within the
private sector in the context of speculative currency crises. The second one is to
understand credit default swaps in a general equilibrium model. Below, I introduce
the subject, discuss key research questions and related works, and preview main
findings briefly.
A. Speculative currency crises
A crisis of a pegged nominal exchange rate is an episode in which the public sell
off domestic money in foreign exchange markets in a sizable scale, as the public’s
confidence in the exchange rate peg falters; meanwhile to defend the peg, the central
bank intervenes, selling foreign exchanges and buying domestic money; as a result,
the central bank loses foreign reserves in a short period of time; such a drastic decline
in foreign reserves triggers the central bank to abandon the peg and devalue the
currency.
Theoretical models in the literature of currency crises often assume the public to
This dissertation follows the style of Econometrica.
2be a homogeneous entity and ignore possible interactions within the private sector in
time of crisis. First-generation models, a´ la, Krugman (1979), and Flood and Garber
(1984), show that due to fiscal imbalances, a government inevitably abandons a fixed
exchange rate at a predictable time. On the contrary, second-generation models, a´
la, Obstfeld (1986), show that crises can be unpredictable due to the existence of
multiple equilibria, i.e., a fixed exchange rate can be brought down by self-fulfilling
speculative attacks, even if it would have been viable perpetually in the absence of
attacks.
One notable strand of research, departing from the paradigm of homogeneous
agents, is pioneered by Morris and Shin (1998). They introduce private information
into a second-generation model and show the uniqueness of equilibrium. A recent
contribution by Broner (2008) introduces private information into a first-generation
model. And he shows that multiple equilibria exist and that unpredictable and large
devaluations are possible in certain equilibria.
Nevertheless, there is no theoretical attempt so far made in the literature to
understand transactions within the private sector in the context of currency crises.
In this work, I postulate that domestic residents have heterogeneous beliefs regarding
how resilient the central bank is in defending the currency. And I study short-term
collateralized loan transactions arising from the divergent beliefs among domestic
residents.
In particular, I consider a small open economy with perfect capital mobility and
a pegged nominal exchange rate. I assume that the domestic central bank abandons
the exchange rate peg and devalues the currency, if its stock of foreign reserves falls
below a critical level.1 I assume domestic residents may do not know the true value
1A different assumption is that after the stock of foreign reserves reaches a critical
level, the central bank floats the exchange rate and controls the resulting nominal
3of this critical level and may have heterogeneous beliefs about it.2 This critical level
measures how resilient the central bank is in defending the currency peg in face of
speculative attacks. With heterogeneous beliefs, it is likely that given the current level
of foreign reserves, some residents expect the peg to remain while others expect the
peg to collapse. As market opinions diverge, loan transactions shall emerge voluntarily
within the private sector. Intuitively, people, who expect the peg to collapse and thus
expect the currency to be devalued, have incentives to sell domestic money short.
They want to borrow domestic money and sell it off in foreign exchange markets. Even
with a high nominal interest rate, due to an expected devaluation, they anticipate
handsome profits from the arbitrage. Others, who expect the peg to remain, willingly
take the counterpart position: lend with an interest rate perceived to be high in both
nominal and real terms.
I study first the benchmark case where all domestic residents’ beliefs about this
critical level of defense are the same and coincide with the true value. I show that
as long as the central bank is resilient enough in defending the currency, the fixed
exchange rate can survive perpetually. Otherwise the pegged exchange rate either
remains viable forever or is brought down by an economy wide self-fulfilling run on
the central bank at some arbitrary time.
And then I introduce heterogeneous beliefs. I assume that domestic residents’
beliefs about the critical level of defense are uniformly distributed over an interval,
money supply, as in Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984), and Obstfeld (1986).
Under this assumption, the floating exchange rate is an endogenous variable, and
there can be no discrete devaluations after the fixed exchange rate collapses.
2One empirical evidence for heterogeneous expectations of the credibility of the
currency peg is presented in Valev and Carlson (2008). It gives a series of survey
data from 2001 to 2004 taken in Bulgaria which introduced a currency board in
1997, showing respondents disagree over the likelihood that the currency board would
collapse in different horizons.
4centered on the true value. I find that loan transactions within the private sector
arising from heterogeneous beliefs make an exchange rate peg vulnerable to specula-
tive attacks. In particular, I show that given a distribution of beliefs across domestic
residents, a fixed exchange rate which remains viable forever if private loans are not
allowed, may be brought down by self-fulfilling speculative attacks at some arbitrary
time if private loans are allowed. And I also show that a peg which remains viable
forever if private loans are allowed, must remain viable if private loans are not allowed.
The core reason is that the possibility to engage in loans pushes up the opportu-
nity cost of holding domestic money—those who expect the peg to collapse perceive
profits of selling domestic money short while those who expect the peg to remain en-
joy high interest rates from the private loans—and thus lowers the aggregate demand
for domestic money.
Interestingly, the heterogeneity of beliefs per se brings stability to the system of
a fixed exchange rate. In particular, I show that a pegged exchange rate which is
subject to self-fulfilling crises if domestic residents’ beliefs are the same, may remain
viable forever if a perturbation of beliefs is introduced. And I also show that a peg
which remains viable forever if domestic residents’ beliefs are the same, must remain
viable if the beliefs are heterogeneous. Intuitively, differences in opinion make the
public’s moves less synchronous. A decline in foreign reserves might gather only a
handful of domestic residents into the crowd to attack the central bank, since some
people do not expect the peg to collapse given their own beliefs.
Hence what gives rise to the vulnerability of the system of a fixed exchange rate
is not the heterogeneity of beliefs per se but the private transactions arising from it.
The assumption of heterogeneous beliefs thus has two consequences: one is desyn-
chronizing actions taken by the public while the other is creating incentives for side
bets among private investors. The former brings stability while the latter generates
5destablizing private transactions. I show that provided the beliefs are not too diverse,
the latter effect dominates. In particular, I show that a pegged exchange rate which
is viable if domestic residents’ beliefs are the same, is subject to self-fulfilling crises if
the beliefs are heterogeneous and private loan transactions are allowed, provided the
perturbation of beliefs is small enough.
In the market for loans, I choose collateral to enforce loan repayments, i.e., when
loans are initiated, borrowers need to pledge certain properties as collateral to secure
loan repayments; failures to repay give lenders the right to seize the pledged prop-
erties. Furthermore, I make collateral negotiable and thus endogenously determined,
following Geanakoplos (1997, 2003, 2010).
From the modeling perspective, it is important to be explicit on enforcement
mechanism when participants in asset markets have different beliefs and meanwhile
unlimited short-selling is not excluded for exogenous reasons. Hart (1974) shows when
short-selling is unlimited, the equilibrium might not exist if people have too much
disagreement over the security returns while the equilibrium does exist if people’s be-
liefs are identical. As Milne (1980) argues, the key assumption that gives rise to the
non-existence result in Hart (1974) is that lenders never question borrowers’ ability
of paying off the loan. Milne (1980) argues even though no restriction on short-selling
is exogenously assumed, some constraints on borrowing shall arise from lenders’s per-
ceptions of default risk. And Milne (1980) shows after introducing some enforcement
mechanism an equilibrium does exist in an asset economy. One alternative mechanism
considered by Milne (1980) is to assume lenders are able to access the information of
borrowers’ portfolios and a loan will be made only when the borrower is solvent in
every contingency which the lender perceives will occur with a positive probability.
The prime advantage of collateral being the enforcement mechanism is anonymity.
As long as the collateral pledged is sound, there is no need for a lender to know the
6identity of the borrower, to have any information of the borrower’s portfolios, and to
believe the borrower is honest.
B. Credit default swaps
Credit default swaps, a class of financial derivatives, had attracted enormous attention
from the public and policy-makers3 since this recent financial crisis.4
A credit default swap is often described as a form of insurance which protects
a lender if a borrower defaults.5 For example, suppose an investor holds a bond
issued by the General Motors Company (GM) and he worries that GM might file a
bankruptcy soon. To hedge the default risk, the investor goes to buy a credit default
swap on GM’s bond. He makes periodic payments to the seller of the credit default
swap in exchange for certain payoffs if GM defaults. In contrast to usual insurance
contracts, credit default swaps have a peculiar feature. The buyer of a credit default
swap is not required to have the insurable interest. It is unnecessarily true that the
buyer suffers a loss from the default. In the example above, without being exposed
to GM’s default, an investor can buy a credit default swap on GM’s bond merely
because he speculates that GM is going to default. For this reason, a credit default
swap can either be used as insurance, hedging default risk, or be used to gamble,
betting against a security, (e.g. GM’s bond in the example above).
The recent financial crisis was preceded by busts in housing markets and subprime
3See Che and Sethi (2011) for a short review of arguments for and against policies
regulating credit default swaps.
4On September 16th 2008, American International Group, Inc. (AIG), the insur-
ance giant, received bailout money up to $85 billion from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, following the downgrade of its credit rating. The liquidity problem facing
AIG at the time was to deposit additional collateral with its trading parties, mainly
with those who had bought credit default swaps from AIG.
5See Stulz (2010) for a review of the mechanics of credit default swaps.
7mortgages. And the credit default swaps involved in the crisis were those on mortgage-
backed securities. The linkage between the decline in home prices and the trading
of credit default swaps on mortgage-backed securities stirred a vast interest from the
public. Nevertheless, theoretical works aimed at understanding this linkage are rare.
One notable contribution is by Geanakoplos (2010). In a model of risk-neutral agents
with heterogeneous beliefs about the return rate of a risky asset, Geanakoplos (2010)
shows that when loans collateralized by the risky asset are allowed, the introduction
of credit default swaps on these collateralized loans depresses the equilibrium price
of the risky asset and eliminates transactions of collateralized loans in equilibrium.
In this work, I study credit default swaps in a general equilibrium model similar to
Geanakoplos (2010). But unlike Geanakoplos (2010), I start with a general framework
which allows for risk-averse agents and allows for more than two states of nature. The
model features a market for a risky asset, (house), a market for loans collateralized
by the risky asset, (mortgages), and a market for credit default swaps which reference
the collateralized loans. Like Geanakoplos (2010), I only consider loans denominated
in a risk-free asset, (cash), and exclude short sales against the risky asset. Following
Geanakoplos (1997, 2003, 2010), collateral requirements, along with interest rates and
loan quantities, are endogenously determined in the market for loans.
Individuals are assumed to be identical in all aspects except for the belief about
the return rate of the risky asset. Due to heterogeneous beliefs, individuals have
incentives to borrow and lend among themselves. Individuals with bullish views want
to purchase the risky asset through borrowing and meanwhile use the obtained risky
asset as collateral, i.e., buying the risky asset on margin. Meanwhile, individuals with
bearish views want to lend, provided the interest rate is high enough and the collateral
is sound enough. Also due to heterogeneous beliefs, individuals have incentives to buy
and sell credit default swaps on these loans among themselves. Since these loans are
8collateralized by the risky asset, for bulls these loans have good chances to be repaid
while for bears these loans are likely to go bad. Hence the former are willing to insure
the repayments of these loans with the latter.
I make two assumptions about trading credit default swaps. First I assume that
a sufficient amount of collateral must be posted to back up the promise made in a
credit default swap so that the seller of the credit default swap would be able to
deliver payoffs in all contingencies. Second, I assume that sellers of credit default
swaps can economize on collateral, meaning that the remnant of the collateral posted
for a credit default swap on a loan can be used as an equivalent substitute for the
risky asset as collateral for the same loan. The consequences of these two assumptions
are (1) buying credit default swaps to alleviate potential losses from loan defaults is
equivalent with lending less and holding additional amounts of the risk-free asset,6
and (2) selling credit default swaps is equivalent with lending under the corresponding
loans.7
Due to these two facts, I show that the introduction of credit default swaps as
insurance only has no effect on the equilibrium price of the risky asset and the market
for collateralized loans. Note this result does not depend on how individuals’ beliefs
about the return rate of the risky asset are specified.
To analyze the effect of introducing credit default swaps both used to hedge
default risk and used to bet against loans collateralized by the risky asset, I make a
6As it is noted in the book by Lewis (2010), the best way to avoid the risk of GM’s
default is not to lend to GM in the first place.
7In practice, credit default swaps are used to structure synthetic collateralized
loans, an example of which is ABACUS 2007-AC1 in the center of the lawsuit against
the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (Goldman Sachs) filed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). According to SEC, investors who bought ABACUS 2007-AC1
were in essence the sellers of the credit default swaps which referenced a variety of
subprime mortgage-backed securities. The official document of the lawsuit is available
at http://www.sec.gov.
9concrete specification of individuals’ beliefs about the return rate of the risky asset.
I assume the economy is divided into two groups: “optimists” and “pessimists”.
Individuals within a group have the same point estimate about the return rate of the
risky asset. Optimists, as their name suggests, have a higher estimate than pessimists
do.
I solve analytically for the price of the risky asset in equilibrium when credit
default swaps both are prohibited and are allowed. I find that as the market for
credit default swaps is introduced, the price of the risky asset in general falls, but this
is not always the case. When the population of pessimists is large enough, opening
up the market for credit default swaps does nothing to the price of the risky asset
and the market for loans collateralized by the risky asset. Interestingly, this is not
because pessimists have no incentives to buy the credit default swaps but because
optimists perceive that the return rate of buying the risky asset on margin dominates
that of selling the credit default swaps and hence there is a lack of incentive on the
side of sellers.
Further, unlike Geanakoplos (2010), I find that in general the introduction of
credit default swaps does not eliminate transactions of collateralized loans in equilib-
rium. It is true only when the population of pessimists is small enough.
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CHAPTER II
SPECULATIVE CURRENCY CRISES
This chapter is devoted to my study on speculative currency crises. The theme of
this study is to theoretically analyze short-term collateralized loans among domestic
residents arising from heterogeneous beliefs in currency crises.
A. The basic model
1. Setup
Consider a small open economy inhabited by a continuum of infinitely lived residents
of mass 1. The time is discrete, meaning markets open only at a set of dates separated
by a unit length of time, i.e., t− 1, t, t+ 1, ....
The domestic central bank stands ready to buy and sell foreign exchanges to peg
the spot nominal exchange rate, defined as the price of foreign currency (dollar) in
terms of domestic currency (peso).
The economy produces and consumes a single trade-able good which perishes in
a unit length of time. Assume purchasing power parity prevails at all times, and the
dollar price of the good is normalized to 1. Hence the domestic price level is equal to
the nominal exchange rate.
A foreign consol-type bond is available to domestic residents, which pays a inter-
est rate with certainty in dollars in perpetuity. Precisely, each unit of the foreign bond
gives i∗ dollars as the interest in each date. The foreign bond is supplied elastically to
the residents in the small economy at a given price, which is exogenously determined
in the rest of the world. Normalize the price of the foreign bond to 1 dollar per unit.
I assume foreigners do not desire peso and peso-denominated assets. I assume
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that the local government does not issue bonds and there are no other domestic assets
except the domestic currency and private loans among residents. Holding domestic
money provides liquidity and thus is desired, even though it yields no interest. When
domestic residents are homogeneous, in equilibrium there are no actual loan transac-
tions, and thus it is safe to drop private loans from their portfolio decision. Below, I
proceed to discuss the problem facing a typical domestic resident with private loans,
while I discuss in detail how domestic residents trade loans later as I introduce het-
erogeneous beliefs.
A typical domestic resident lives forever and maximizes the lifetime utility:
∑
1,2,...,∞
u(zt,mt)
(1 + i∗)t−1
, (2.1)
where z denotes consumption and m denotes real cash balance defined as M
S
, M
denotes the holding domestic money and S denotes the nominal exchange rate. Above,
I assume that holding domestic money gives utility directly. Further, I assume that
the utility function is separable in z and m and that the intertemporal substitution
of consumption is perfectly elastic, i.e.,
u(z,m) = z + l(m) . (2.2)
A typical domestic resident is facing two budget constraints at each date: a stock
constraint and a flow one. Let w denotes the wealth in real terms held by a domestic
resident, which is equal to the sum of the real money stock and the foreign bond, i.e.,
for all t,
wt = mt + ft , (2.3)
where f denotes the holding of the foreign bond. Initially a typical domestic resident
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starts with some nominal money stock M0 > 0 and some foreign bond f0 > 0. I use
w0 to denote the initial wealth for a typical resident. Hence w0 = f0 +
M0
S0
. The flow
constraint at date t gives,
wt − wt−1 + zt = i∗ · ft−1 −mt−1pit + y , (2.4)
where y denotes the exogenous constant income flow received by a typical individual,
pit denotes the rate of depreciation of domestic money defined as pit ≡ St−St−1St .
At each date, a typical domestic resident chooses consumption and portfolio given
the wealth that he is left with from the past. The necessary conditions for maximizing
(2.1) subject to (2.3) and (2.4) imply: first consumption zt is indeterminate; second
the demand for money is given by
l′(mt) =
i∗ + pit+1
1 + i∗
. (2.5)
Let L(·) = [l′(·)(1 + i∗)]−1. Hence
mt = L(i∗ + pit+1) . (2.6)
The local fiscal authority does not issue bonds, and the local central bank holds
the foreign bond as reserves to peg the nominal exchange rate at S¯ > 0. The consol-
idated government flow budget constraint at date t gives,
f gt − f gt−1 + gt = mt −mt−1 +mt−1pit + i∗ · f gt−1 , (2.7)
where f g denotes the foreign bond held by the central bank and g denotes the gov-
ernment spending. I assume the central bank maintains a sufficient amount of foreign
reserves just enough to absorb the entire money supply at all dates. Initially M0
S0
= f g0 .
Without loss of generality, let f g0 = 1. As a result, the government spending is fi-
nanced by the interest earned from the foreign bond plus revenues from the inflation
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tax. Since the central bank pegs the exchange rate at a constant level S¯, the inflation
tax is zero, and hence,
i∗ · f gt = gt . (2.8)
Combine flow budget constraints for the private sector and the government, (2.3),
(2.4), and (2.7), I get the balance of payments equation,
fat − fat−1 = y − zt − gt + i∗ · fat−1 , (2.9)
where fa denotes the aggregate holding of the foreign bond by the entire economy,
i.e., fa = f+f g. The long-run stationary equilibrium requires that fat = f
a
t−1. Hence,
in the long-run equilibrium,
zt = y + i
∗ · ft−1 . (2.10)
And the real cash balances for a typical resident in the long-run stationary equilibrium
should be L(i∗). Without loss of generality, let L(i∗) = 1.
2. Speculative currency crises
In the basic setup described above, the central bank never abandons the pegged
exchange rate. From now on, I assume that the decision for the domestic central
bank to abandon the peg is dependent on the amount of foreign reserves. At the
beginning of each date just before markets open, the domestic central bank announces
the decision: either it continues to peg the nominal exchange rate at S¯ or it devalues
the currency. I assume in the event of devaluation, the domestic central bank will
peg the nominal exchange rate at a new level thereafter and the new peg is known to
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the public, denoted by Sˆ > S¯. Let
p¯i ≡ Sˆ − S¯
Sˆ
. (2.11)
The central bank decides to abandon the peg at date t provided f gt−1 falls below
a critical level, denoted by f¯ g ∈ [0, 1], which captures the resilience of the system
of a fixed exchange rate. The value of f¯ g is not necessarily known to the public.
Moreover, in the succeeding section, I assume that domestic residents might have
different beliefs about f¯ g, which induces heterogeneous expectations regarding the
prospective exchange rates. Before heading forward, I analyze the case where domestic
residents all have the same belief about f¯ g which also coincides with the true value.
θ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the true value of f¯ g.
Suppose at date t, the central bank devalues the currency. Since the public
anticipates no more devaluation thereafter, and then the economy reaches the long-
run stationary equilibrium immediately. All variables stay constant starting from date
t. The real cash balances is equal to L(i∗), the consumption is equal to (i∗ft + y),
and ft is given by
(1 + i∗)ft + L(i∗) = (1 + i∗)ft−1 + (1− p¯i)mt−1 . (2.12)
Suppose at date t, the central bank still pegs the nominal exchange rate at S¯.
The public understand that the expected devaluation rate should be dependent on
f gt , i.e.,
pit+1 = 1{f gt < θ} · p¯i + 1{f gt ≥ θ} · 0 . (2.13)
Meanwhile the demand for money at date t by the public is given by L(i∗ + pit+1).
15
By the central bank’s balance sheet, mt = f
g
t . In equilibrium,
f gt = L
(
i∗ + p¯i · 1{f gt < θ}
)
. (2.14)
For illustration, in Fig. 1, I graph the demand for money at date t, which is the
right hand side of the equation above, against the stock of foreign reserves for the
central bank at date t, i.e., f gt . The intersections of the curve with the 45
◦ line are
the possible solutions to the equation above and thus are the possible equilibria.
As Fig. 1 shows, depending on where the true value of f¯ g lies relative to L(i∗+p¯i),
there are in general two scenarios. If the system of the fixed exchange rate at S¯ is
resilient, i.e., θ is low, if all domestic residents expect the peg to collapse, the loss of
foreign reserves is not sufficient to bring down the system, precisely, i.e., θ ≤ L(i∗+p¯i),
and hence the central bank is not subject to self-fulfilling currency attacks. If the
peg S¯ is not resilient, i.e., θ > L(i∗ + p¯i), the system of the fixed exchange rate can
be brought down by an economy wide speculative attack at any arbitrary time, even
if it might remain viable permanently in the absence of the attack. The results are
formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. When it it assumed that domestic residents believe f¯ g = θ, if θ ∈
(0,L(i∗ + p¯i)], and then the equilibrium is unique: at all dates domestic residents all
hold domestic money L(i∗) and the domestic central bank pegs the exchange rate at
S¯; if θ ∈ (L(i∗ + p¯i), 1], and then there are two types of equilibria: (1) at all dates
domestic residents all hold domestic money L(i∗) and the domestic central bank pegs
the exchange rate at S¯, and (2) at some arbitrary date, domestic residents all lower
the demand for domestic money to L(i∗+ p¯i), which triggers the domestic central bank
to abandon the peg S¯ and to devalue the currency at the rate p¯i at the succeeding date.
16
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Fig. 1. Equilibria with homogeneous belief.
Above I obtain the standard result of multiple equilibria in the literature of
currency crises. Below, I depart from the assumption that domestic residents’ beliefs
about f¯ g are the same.
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B. Heterogeneous beliefs
From this section on, I assume that domestic residents’ beliefs about f¯ g are uniformly
distributed over [θ − δ, θ + δ] ⊂ [0, 1]. K(·) denotes the mass of domestic residents
whose beliefs on f¯ g are less than a given value. For the sake of exposition, θx is used
to denote the belief about f¯ g by domestic resident x ∈ [0, 1].
1. Without private loans
To understand the role that private loans play in currency crises, in this subsection,
I first study the case with heterogeneous beliefs but without private loans. Since
domestic residents’ beliefs on f¯ g may not coincide with the true value, it is possible
that as some domestic residents run on the central bank, the loss of foreign reserves is
not sufficiently large to trigger the collapse of the peg. After unsuccessful speculative
attacks, domestic residents should refine or correct their beliefs about f¯ g. Neverthe-
less, I restrict attention to the type of equilibria in which speculative currency attacks
take place at most once.
Suppose at date t, the central bank still pegs the nominal exchange rate at S¯.
For domestic residents θx ≤ f gt , they hold real cash balances L(i∗), while for domestic
residents θx > f
g
t , L(i∗ + p¯i). Hence in the aggregate,
f gt = K(f
g
t ) · L(i∗) + (1−K(f gt )) · L(i∗ + p¯i) , (2.15)
where K(f gt ) =
fgt −θ+δ
2δ
if f gt ∈ [θ − δ, θ + δ]; K(f gt ) = 0 if f gt < θ − δ, and K(f gt ) = 1
if f gt > θ + δ.
In Figs. 2-3, I graph the aggregate demand for money at date t, which is the
right hand side of the equation above, against the stock of foreign reserves for the
central bank at date t, i.e., f gt . The intersections of the curve with the 45
◦ line are
18
the possible solutions to (2.15) and thus are the possible equilibria. Fig. 2 shows the
case with no speculative attacks, while Fig. 3 shows two other cases. For both cases,
there exists a type of equilibria in which only a fraction of the economy expecting the
central bank to abandon the peg S¯. The difference is that, in this type of equilibria,
in one case the central bank in fact abandons the peg while in the other case it does
not. Theorem 2 states the possible equilibria, given a range of values for θ.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.H.S  /  R.H.S 


 
45° line 
   0                                        1 
	
  1  
	
  π 
Fig. 2. Unique equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs without private loans.
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(b) one successful attack and the other unsuccessful
Fig. 3. Multiple equilibria with heterogeneous beliefs without private loans.
Theorem 2. When it is assumed that domestic residents’ beliefs about f¯ g are uni-
formly distributed over [θ − δ, θ + δ] ⊂ [0, 1], if θ ∈ (0,L(i∗ + p¯i) + δ), the equilibrium
is unique: at all dates domestic residents all hold domestic money L(i∗) and the do-
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mestic central bank pegs the exchange rate at S¯; if θ ∈ [L(i∗ + p¯i) + δ, 1), there are
three types of equilibria: (1) at all dates domestic residents all hold domestic money
L(i∗) and the domestic central bank pegs the exchange rate at S¯, (2) at some arbitrary
date, domestic residents all lower the demand for domestic money to L(i∗+ p¯i), which
triggers the domestic central bank to abandon the peg S¯ and to devalue the currency at
the rate p¯i at the succeeding date, and (3) at some arbitrary date, domestic residents
of mass θ−δ−L(i
∗+p¯i)
L(i∗)−L(i∗+p¯i)−2δ hold domestic money L(i∗) while the rest lower the demand
for domestic money to L(i∗ + p¯i), which in the aggregate depletes the foreign reserves
to
L(i∗)(θ − δ)− L(i∗ + p¯i)(θ + δ)
L(i∗)− L(i∗ + p¯i)− 2δ , (2.16)
which triggers the domestic central bank to abandon the peg S¯ and to devalue the
currency at the rate p¯i, provided θ < L(i
∗+p¯i)+L(i∗)
2
.
One main implication of Theorem 2 is as follows. If θ, the index of resilience
of the system, lies in the interval (L(i∗ + p¯i),L(i∗ + p¯i) + δ), the system of the fixed
exchange rate at S¯ is subject to self-fulfilling currency crises when domestic residents’
beliefs are homogeneous and coincide with θ, while the peg S¯ shall remain viable
permanently when a perturbation of beliefs is introduced. Intuitively, this means that
a heterogeneity of beliefs per se would make self-fulfilling currency crises less likely
to take place. Note as δ approaches to zero, the interval (L(i∗ + p¯i),L(i∗ + p¯i) + δ)
vanishes to a void set.
It is interesting to note that when θ ≥ L(i∗+ p¯i) + δ, as θ decreases, for the type
of equilibria in which only a fraction of the economy expecting the central bank to
abandon the peg S¯, the speculative attack goes from failure to success. This appears
to say counter-intuitively that as the system of the fixed exchange rate at S¯ becomes
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more resilient, the system becomes more likely to collapse. The key is to note that as
θ decreases, not only the system in fact becomes more resilient, but also the public
anticipate that the losses of reserves must be larger to bring the system down. Hence
if there is a speculative attack launched by a fraction of domestic residents, the stock
of foreign reserves must be lower and thus the fraction must be larger as θ decreases.
That the fraction of speculators gets larger implies that the decline in foreign reserves
must exceed that in θ. This explains why as θ decreases the speculative attack goes
from failure to success.
2. Market for private loans
All private loans mature in a unit length of time, i.e., a loan initiated at date t matures
at date t + 1. Private loans are denominated in pesos.1 If a domestic resident lends
at date t, he pays some pesos at date t and is supposed to receive some pesos as
the repayment at date t + 1; if the domestic resident borrows, he instead receives
some pesos and is required to hold some assets as the collateral at date t, and he is
supposed to repay some pesos at date t + 1. When the loan is not repaid at date
t+ 1, the collateral is seized to pay off the loan. I assume peso and the foreign bond
are enforce-able collateral for loans among domestic residents.
A peso-denominated private loan is defined by a triple, (R, cf , cm), which states
the repayment rate and the characteristics of collateral. Table I gives the definition
for each contract terms. Geanakoplos (2010) points out that the key to endogenize
1Dollar-denominated loans are redundant, provided I assume peso-denominated
loans can not be used as collateral. If a domestic resident wants to borrow in dollars,
he needs to pay a gross interest rate, not smaller than (1 + i∗). To back up the loan
repayments, he can post either the foreign bond or peso as the collateral. But the
reason why some domestic residents want to borrow in dollars presumably is to take
the advantage of the interest rate gap between the foreign bond and some domestic
peso-denominated loans. Since they are unable to buy peso-denominated loans on
margin, these domestic residents do not find incentives to borrow in dollars any more.
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Table I. Three contract terms in a loan
Variable
R Pesos to repay / Notional value
cf Peso value of the foreign bond posted as collateral / Notional value
cm Pesos posted as collateral / Notional value
collateral is to index promises by their collateral as we index commodities by their
qualities. Barro (1976) makes a similar point that a price of a loan should not only
include the interest rate but also the characteristics of collateral.
For example, suppose the notional value of a loan (1.2, 0.8, 0.1) is 100. R = 1.2
means 120 pesos needs to be repaid when the loan is due, cm = 0.1 implies 10 pesos
is put up as the collateral when the loan is initiated. cf = 0.8 means the amount of
the foreign bond pledged as the collateral is worth 80 pesos at time when the loan is
initiated.
Domestic residents borrow and lend not in a bilateral way but in Walrasian
markets. For each loan, given its associated price, domestic residents submit their
orders of borrowing or lending to a Walrasian auctioneer. For example, if domestic
residents want to borrow or to lend under loan (1.2, 0.8, 0.1), they need to tell the
auctioneer how much they want to borrow or to lend. The notional value is the number
that domestic residents use to communicate with the auctioneer about the quantity
to borrow or to lend. If a borrowing order is placed under loan (1.2, 0.8, 0.1) of a
notional value 100, the auctioneer writes −100 in its calculation of market clearing.
If a lending order is placed of a notional value 150, the auctioneer adds +150. The
market for loan (1.2, 0.8, 0.1) is cleared, when after summing up the numbers from all
orders the auctioneer gets zero.
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The price of a loan is pesos per notional value to pay for those who want to lend
(or to receive for those who want to borrow) when the loan is initiated. For example,
if the price of loan (1.2, 0.8, 0.1) is 0.5 pesos per notional value, and if a domestic
resident wants to lend under loan (1.2, 0.8, 0.1) of a notional value 100, he needs to
pay 50 pesos. Formally, there is a mapping which associates a loan with a price,
pt(R, cf , cm) : <3+ → <+ , (2.17)
where pt(R, cf , cm) is the price for loan (R, cf , cm) at date t. The auctioneer announces
the price of a loan and adjusts it until the market for the loan is cleared. After a
market clearing price is reached, the auctioneer collects payments from those who
place a lending order and distribute them to those who place a borrowing order when
the loan is initiated and collects repayments from borrowers and distribute them to
lenders when the loan matures. The promised repayment of a loan does not necessarily
coincide with the actual repayment. Under the collateral mechanism, borrowers will
repay the loan only when the collateral is worth more than the amount due, i.e.,
whenever
R ≤ cf · St+1
St
· (1 + i∗) + cm , (2.18)
the loan will be paid off, otherwise borrowers default and the collateral is seized. Note
whether or not the loan is paid off is contingent on St+1
St
.
r(pit+1;R, cf , cm) denotes the actual return rate for loan (R, cf , cm), and
r(pit+1;R, cf , cm) = min{R, 1 + i
∗
1− pit+1 · cf + cm} . (2.19)
Note r(pit+1;R, cf , cm) is homogeneous of degree one with respect to (R, cf , cm). So
is pt(R, cf , cm), if certain types of arbitrage activities are allowed. Without loss of
generality, I assume domestic residents restrict their choices to the set of loans the
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price of which is 1. Ωt denotes this set at date t,
Ωt = {(R, cf , cm) ∈ <3+ ‖ pt(R, cf , cm) = 1} . (2.20)
3. Individual problem with private loans
Since domestic residents are identical in all aspects except for beliefs about f¯ g, the
analysis below is applicable to all.
Given Ωt, the set of private loans available in the market at date t, a typi-
cal domestic resident decides the quantity of borrowing or lending for each peso-
denominated loan. The choices are represented by a mapping,
Bt
(
R, cf , cm
)
: Ωt −→ < , (2.21)
which associates a loan with the notional value of the loan to borrow or to lend. If
Bt
(
R, cf , cm
)
< 0, it indicates borrowing. I define
bt(R, cf , cm) =
Bt(R, cf , cm)
St
, (2.22)
where bt(R, cf , cm) is the holding of private loan (R, cf , cm) in real terms.
The stock budget constraint becomes,
wt = ft +mt +
∑
Ωt
bt(R, cf , cm) . (2.23)
The flow budget constraint becomes,
ft +mt +
∑
Ωt
bt(R, cf , cm) + zt =
(1 + i∗)ft−1 + (1− pit)mt−1 + y +
∑
Ωt−1
r(pit;R, cf , cm) · (1− pit) · bt−1(R, cf , cm) .
(2.24)
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In addition, there are two collateral constraints,
mt ≥ −
∑
Ωt
[
cm ·min
{
bt(R, cf , cm), 0
}]
, (2.25)
ft ≥ −
∑
Ωt
[
cf ·min
{
bt(R, cf , cm), 0
}]
. (2.26)
The following lemma gives the Euler-Lagrange equations. Let λ denote the La-
grange multiplier with respect to the flow constraint (2.24), µm the Lagrange multi-
plier with respect to collateral constraint (2.25), and µf the Lagrange multiplier with
respect to collateral constraint (2.26).
Lemma 1. If {zt,mt, ft, bt(·), λt, µft , µmt }∞1 maximizes (2.1) subject to (2.24), (2.25),
and (2.26), it should satisfy following conditions,
1− λt ≤ 0 , (2.27)
where the equality holds if zt > 0;
λt+1 − λt + µft ≤ 0 , (2.28)
where the equality holds if ft > 0;
1− pit+1
1 + i∗
λt+1 + l
′(mt)− λt + µmt ≤ 0 , (2.29)
where the equality holds if mt > 0; for any (R, cf , cm) ∈ Ωt such that bt(R, cf , cm) 6= 0,
it must be,
r
(
pit+1;R, cf , cm
)1− pit+1
1 + i∗
λt+1 − λt + (µmt cm + µft cf ) · 1{bt(R, cf , cm) < 0} = 0 ;
(2.30)
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for any (R, cf , cm) ∈ Ωt such that bt(R, cf , cm) = 0, it must be,
r
(
pit+1;R, cf , cm
)1− pit+1
1 + i∗
λt+1 − λt ≤ 0 , (2.31)
r
(
pit+1;R, cf , cm
)1− pit+1
1 + i∗
λt+1 − λt + µmt cm + µft cf ≥ 0 . (2.32)
C. Equilibria with private loans
As in the case where private loans are not allowed, I restrict attention to the type of
equilibria in which speculative currency attacks take place at most once. Suppose up
to date t, the central bank still pegs the exchange rate at S¯. The following lemma
proves the impossibility of no transaction of private loans whenever there exists a
division among domestic residents at date t: some expect the peg S¯ to remain at date
t+ 1 while the rest expect it to collapse.
Lemma 2. In equilibria with collateralized private loans, and f gt ∈ (θ − δ, θ + δ), it
is impossible that no private loan is traded at date t.
Proof. Prove by contradiction. Suppose, in an equilibrium, f gt ∈ (θ−δ, θ+δ), there is
no transaction of private loans among domestic residents. Due to f gt ∈ (θ− δ, θ + δ),
λt+1 = 1 since the run on the central bank would not take place after date t. No
transaction of private loans implies that for all domestic residents µft = µ
m
t = 0 and
λt = 1. Hence ∀θx ∈ [θ − δ, θ + δ], ∀(R, cf , cm) ∈ Ωt,r(pit+1;R, cf , cm) · 1−pit+11+i∗ = 1 .
Note pit+1 = p¯i · 1{f gt < θx}+ 0 · 1{f gt ≥ θx}. Contradiction.
The following two lemmas state the possible patterns of loan transaction in equi-
librium. The proofs are in Appendix A. As f gt ∈ (θ− δ, θ+ δ), there is a line dividing
the economy into two brigades: domestic residents θx ≤ f gt expect pit+1 = 0 while
domestic residents θx > f
g
t expect pit+1 = p¯i. In preview, the type of transactions of
substance is that domestic residents θx > f
g
t borrow. Nevertheless, it is possible that
27
θx ≤ f gt borrow, but the transactions can be omitted without impact and thus are
redundant.
Lemma 3. In the type of equilibria in which speculative currency attacks take place at
most once and collateralized private loans are allowed to trade freely among domestic
residents, if f gt ∈ (θ − δ, θ + δ) and domestic residents θx ≤ f gt borrow from domestic
residents θx > f
g
t under some loan (R, cf , cm) ∈ Ωt, it must be that
• either R ≥ 1+i∗
1−p¯i and cf (1 + i
∗) + cm(1− p¯i) = (1 + i∗),
• or R = 1+i∗
1−p¯i , cf = 0, and cm(1− p¯i) > (1 + i∗).
When cm > 0, for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt , µmt = 0, λt = 11−p¯i , and domestic
residents θx ≤ f gt must lend to domestic residents θx > f gt under other loans.
Lemma 3 states the loans that domestic residents θx ≤ f gt would possibly borrow
in equilibrium. According to Lemma 3, if they borrow, domestic residents θx ≤ f gt
lower the demand for money at date t from L(i∗) to L( i∗+p¯i
1−p¯i ). And they do not hold
the foreign bond except as the collateral. It shall be seen later that the transactions
in which domestic residents θx ≤ f gt borrow are of no substance and can be omitted.
Lemma 4. In the type of equilibria in which speculative currency attacks take place at
most once and collateralized private loans are allowed to trade freely among domestic
residents, if f gt ∈ (θ − δ, θ + δ) and domestic residents θx > f gt borrow from domestic
residents θx ≤ f gt under some loan (R, cf , cm) ∈ Ωt, there can be two scenarios: (1)
for domestic residents θx > f
g
t , µ
f
t = µ
m
t = 0, either R =
1+i∗
1−p¯i and cf (1 + i
∗) + cm ≥
1+i∗
1−p¯i , or cf = 0, cm =
1+i∗
1−p¯i , and R >
1+i∗
1−p¯i ; (2)for domestic residents θx > f
g
t ,
µft = µ
m
t (1 + i
∗) > 0, either R = cf (1 + i∗) + cm < 1+i
∗
1−p¯i , or cf = 0, R > cm, and
0 < cm <
1+i∗
1−p¯i .
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Combining Lemma 2-4, given a value f gt ∈ (θ − δ, θ + δ), what happens in the
market for private loans falls into two categories: (1) for domestic residents θx > f
g
t ,
µft = µ
m
t = 0, i.e., when both collateral constraints are slack, and (2) for domestic
residents θx > f
g
t , µ
f
t , µ
m
t > 0, i.e., when both collateral constraints are binding. In
the first case, the set of private loans available, Ωt, should satisfy,
Ωt = { (R, cf , cm) ∈ <3+ ‖ r(p¯i;R, cf , cm) =
1 + i∗
1− p¯i } , (2.33)
and thus domestic residents θx > f
g
t view all private loans in Ωt indifferent to the for-
eign bond. Fig. 4 depicts Ωt in a 3-dimensional space. By Lemma 3, the transactions
in which domestic residents θx ≤ f gt borrow can only happen in the first case.
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Fig. 4. Ωt when for domestic residents θx > f
g
t both collateral constraints are slack.
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Further, Ωt can be classified into three parts, not necessarily exclusive, namely
D1, D2, and D3.
D1 ≡ { (R, cf , cm) ∈ <3+‖R ≥
1 + i∗
1− p¯i , cf (1 + i
∗) + cm(1− p¯i) = 1 + i∗ }
∪ { (R, cf , cm) ∈ <3+‖R =
1 + i∗
1− p¯i , cf = 0, cm >
1 + i∗
1− p¯i } , (2.34)
D2 ≡ { (R, cf , cm) ∈ <3+‖R =
1 + i∗
1− p¯i , cf (1 + i
∗) + cm <
1 + i∗
1− p¯i < cf } , (2.35)
D3 ≡ { (R, cf , cm) ∈ <3+‖R =
1 + i∗
1− p¯i , cf (1 + i
∗) + cm ≥ 1 + i
∗
1− p¯i }
∪ { (R, cf , cm) ∈ <3+‖R >
1 + i∗
1− p¯i , cf = 0, cm =
1 + i∗
1− p¯i } . (2.36)
D1 represents all loans under which domestic residents θx ≤ f gt would possibly borrow
in the first case. D3 represents all loans under which domestic residents θx ≤ f gt
willingly lend to those θx > f
g
t in the first case.
Any loans in D3 are preferred by domestic residents θx ≤ f gt over the foreign
bond and hence the incentives for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt to borrow do not come
from financing the purchases of the foreign bond but come either from financing the
purchases of the private loans in D3 or from the liquidity concerns. That private loans
can not be used as collateral and that for loans in Ωt, cf + cm ≥ 1, imply that there
is no funds left to purchase the private loans in D3 from the revenue of borrowing.
Therefore, domestic residents θx ≤ f gt borrow only because they invest too much in
the private loans in D3, which results in a shortage of cash. Hence the quantities of
borrowing for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt are residuals after the quantities of lending
under the loans in D3 and the holding of domestic money are determined. As a result,
it is safe to set the quantities of borrowing for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt to zero.
For domestic residents θx ≤ f gt , the loans in D3 are the same and they are willing
to use all resources available at date t, subtracting the demand for domestic money,
to lend under the loans in D3. Meanwhile, domestic residents θx > f
g
t must hold a
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sufficient amount of collateral to absorb the borrowing orders under the loans in D3,
which leads to a condition,
1− p¯i
p¯i
· (1 + i
∗)f0 +m0 + y − i∗1+i∗L(i∗ + p¯i)
(1 + i∗)f0 +m0 + y − L( i∗+p¯i1−p¯i )
≥ K(f
g
t )
1−K(f gt )
. (2.37)
For the convenience of exposition, let
β ≡ (1− p¯i) · [(1 + i
∗)f0 +m0 + y − i∗1+i∗L(i∗ + p¯i)]
(1 + i∗)f0 +m0 + y − p¯i · L( i∗+p¯i1−p¯i )− (1− p¯i) i
∗
1+i∗L(i∗ + p¯i)
. (2.38)
According to Lemma 4, in the second case where for domestic residents θx > f
g
t ,
µft , µ
m
t > 0, for a given value of f
g
t ∈ (θ − δ, θ + δ), there exists a constant, Rˆ ∈
(1 + i∗, 1+i
∗
1−p¯i ) such that domestic residents θx > f
g
t borrow from those θx ≤ f gt under
the loans in D4, defined as follows,
D4 ≡ { (R, cf , cm) ∈ <3+‖R = cf (1 + i∗) + cm = Rˆ }
∪ { (R, cf , cm) ∈ <3+‖R > Rˆ, cf = 0, cm = Rˆ } . (2.39)
Moreover, in the second case, for domestic residents θx > f
g
t , the demand for money
is equal to L( (1+i∗)(Rˆ−1)p¯i
Rˆ−(1+i∗) ) while for domestic residents θx ≤ f
g
t , the demand for money
is equal to L(Rˆ− 1). Further, the clearing condition in the market for loans gives,
Rˆ− (1 + i∗)
1 + i∗
=
1−K(f gt )
K(f gt )
·
(1 + i∗)f0 +m0 + y − i∗1+i∗L( (1+i
∗)(Rˆ−1)p¯i
Rˆ−(1+i∗) )
(1 + i∗)f0 +m0 + y − L(Rˆ− 1)
. (2.40)
The equation above defines a mapping from f gt ∈ (θ − δ, θ + δ) to Rˆ. Let s(·) denote
this mapping, i.e., Rˆ = s(f gt ). In the second case, the set of loans available in the
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market can be as follows. Fig. 5 depicts Ωt in the second case.
Ωt = { (R, cf , cm) ∈ <3+‖R = Rˆ, cf (1 + i∗) + cm ≥ Rˆ }∪
{ (R, cf , cm)<3+‖R > Rˆ,R 1−p¯i1+i∗ + (1+i
∗)−Rˆ(1−p¯i)
Rˆ−(1+i∗) (cf +
cm
1+i∗ ) =
Rˆp¯i
Rˆ−(1+i∗) , cf Rˆ + cm ≥ Rˆ }
∪ { (R, cf , cm)<3+‖R 1−p¯i1+i∗ + (1+i
∗)−Rˆ(1−p¯i)
Rˆ−(1+i∗) (cf +
cm
1+i∗ ) >
Rˆp¯i
Rˆ−(1+i∗) , cf Rˆ + cm = Rˆ } .
(2.41)
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Fig. 5. Ωt when for domestic residents θx > f
g
t both collateral constraints are binding.
The following lemma states provided K(f gt ) ≤ β, what happens in the market
for private loans falls into the first category, otherwise the second one.
32
Lemma 5. In the type of equilibria in which speculative currency attack takes place at
most once and collateralized private loans are allowed to trade freely among domestic
residents, if f gt ∈ (θ − δ, θ + δ), there are only two possibilities.
1. When 0 < K(f gt ) ≤ β: for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt , the holding of domestic
money is L( i∗+pi
1−pi ); for domestic residents θx > f
g
t , the holding domestic money
is L(i∗ + pi).
2. When β < K(f gt ) < 1: for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt , the holding of domestic
money is L(Rˆ−1); for domestic residents θx > f gt , the holding domestic money
is L( (1+i∗)(Rˆ−1)p¯i
Rˆ−(1+i∗) ), where Rˆ is defined in (2.40).
Note β is defined in (2.38).
Immediately from Lemma 5, the aggregate demand for money at date t can be
written as a function of f gt .
mt(f
g
t ; δ, p¯i) = 1{K(f gt ) = 0} · L(i∗ + p¯i) + 1{K(f gt ) = 1} · L(i∗)
+K(f gt ) ·
[
1{β < K(f gt ) < 1} · L(s(f gt )− 1) + 1{0 < K(f gt ) ≤ β} · L(
i∗ + p¯i
1− p¯i )
]
+ (1−K(f gt )) ·
[
1{β < K(f gt ) < 1} · L(
(1 + i∗)(s(f gt )− 1)p¯i
s(f gt )− (1 + i∗)
)
+ 1{0 < K(f gt ) ≤ β} · L(i∗ + p¯i)
]
. (2.42)
For any given value of f gt ∈ (θ − δ, θ + δ), opening the market for private loans
lowers the aggregate demand for money. The possibility to engage in loans pushes
up the opportunity cost of holding cash: domestic residents all find some lucrative
businesses yielding higher returns than the foreign bond. For those who expect the
peg S¯ to remain, by lending to the other crowd, they enjoy an interest rate higher
than (1 + i∗); for those who expect the peg S¯ to collapse, by borrowing under a high
nominal interest rate but accordingly a low real rate, they enjoy the arbitrage from
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selling pesos short. Therefore, private loan transactions lower the demand for money
in the aggregate for any given value of f gt ∈ (θ − δ, θ + δ).
Further, counter-intuitively the aggregate demand for domestic money can be
lower when only a fraction of domestic residents who expect the peg to collapse than
when all domestic residents expect so. Precisely, mt(f
g
t ; θ, δ) = L(i∗ + p¯i) provided
f gt ≤ θ−δ; mt(f gt ; θ, δ) = β ·L( i∗+p¯i1−p¯i )+(1−β)·L(i∗+p¯i), when K(f gt ) = β. Interestingly,
the nominal interest rate prevailing in the market is i
∗+p¯i
1−p¯i both when f
g
t ≤ θ − δ and
when K(f gt ) = β. What makes the difference in the aggregate demand for money
is that in the latter case a fraction of domestic residents expect the peg to remain
while they expect it to collapse in the former case. Given the same nominal interest
rate, a resident perceives a higher opportunity cost of holding domestic money when
a devaluation is expected than when it is not.
Due to the observations above, intuitively loan transactions within the private
sector arising from heterogeneous beliefs might make a pegged exchange rate vulner-
able to speculative attacks. The following two results formalize this idea. I first show
that given a distribution of beliefs on f¯ g, there exists a situation in which the peg S¯
can remain viable permanently provided private loans are not allowed but it can be
brought down by speculative attacks at some arbitrary date when private loans are
allowed.
Theorem 3. Domestic residents’ beliefs about f¯ g are uniformly distributed over [θ−
δ, θ+ δ] ⊂ [0, 1]. ∃ a value for θ < L(i∗+ p¯i) + δ, such that when collateralized private
loans are allowed to trade freely among domestic residents, there exist at least two
types of equilibria.
1. At all dates all domestic residents expect no devaluation and hold domestic
money L(i∗), and the domestic central bank pegs the exchange rate at S¯ at all
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dates.
2. At at some arbitrary date t, f gt ∈ (θ − δ, θ), and the central bank abandons the
peg S¯ at date t+ 1.
Proof. Since mt(θ−δ; θ, p¯i) = L(i∗+p¯i) > θ−δ, it is always possible to find a value for θ
such that ∃0 <  < β, ·L( i∗+p¯i
1−p¯i )+(1−)·L(i∗+p¯i) < f gt and f gt = θ−(1−2)δ < θ.
Second, I show that when θ = L(i∗ + p¯i) the peg S¯ is perpetually viable if
domestic residents have the homogeneous belief about f¯ g which coincides with the
true value, while the peg S¯ can be brought down by speculative attacks as a small
enough perturbation of beliefs is introduced, i.e., as δ is small enough.
Theorem 4. When θ = L(i∗ + p¯i), ∃ a value for δ, such that if domestic residents’
beliefs about f¯ g are uniformly distributed over [θ−δ, θ+δ] ⊂ [0, 1] and if collateralized
private loans are allowed to trade freely among domestic residents, there exist at least
two types of equilibria.
1. At all dates all domestic residents expect no devaluation and hold domestic
money L(i∗), and the domestic central bank pegs the exchange rate at S¯ at all
dates.
2. At at some arbitrary date t, f gt ∈ (θ − δ, θ), and the central bank abandons the
peg S¯ at date t+ 1.
Proof. Since mt(θ− δ; θ, p¯i) = L(i∗+ p¯i) = θ, it is always possible to find a value for δ
such that ∃0 <  < β, ·L( i∗+p¯i
1−p¯i )+(1−)·L(i∗+p¯i) < f gt and f gt = θ−(1−2)δ < θ.
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CHAPTER III
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
A. The model
1. Setup
Consider an economy of two periods, which is inhabited by a continuum of individuals
of mass 1. There are one consumption good, and two perfectly divisible assets both
of which yield nothing in the 1st period but some exogenous flows of the consumption
good in the 2nd period. The difference is: one pays a non-random return rate and
the other random. I call the former the risk-free asset denoted by a, (cash and unit
is dollar) while the latter the risky asset denoted by k, (house).
I normalize the return rate for the risk-free asset to 1, i.e., holding 1 unit of
the risk-free asset in the 1st period gives 1 unit of the consumption good in the 2nd
period. The return rate of the risky asset is denoted by a random variable X, and x
denotes the realization of X. The aggregate supplies of both assets in the economy
are fixed. All individuals are initially endowed with a0 amount of the risk-free asset
and k0 amount of the risky asset, but there is no endowment of the consumption good
in the 1st period.
In addition to the two physical assets mentioned above, I consider loans among
individuals collateralized by the risky asset (mortgages). But I only consider loans in
which the repayments are expressed in terms of the risk-free asset (cash) and hence
I exclude short sales against the risky asset (house). Further, I introduce credit
default swaps which reference the collateralized loans. Detailed discussions of these
two financial assets are in the succeeding subsections.
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Individuals are identical in all aspects expect for the beliefs about X. Heteroge-
neous beliefs about the return rate of the risky asset give rise to transactions of loans
and credit default swaps among individuals. The problem facing a typical individual
is to select a portfolio in the 1st period, given its belief about X. Individuals do not
consume in the 1st period and the menu for choosing a portfolio includes: the risk-
free asset, the risky asset, loans collateralized by the risky asset, and credit default
swaps on collateralized loans. In the 2nd period, after the true value of X is revealed,
individuals collect proceeds, make payments, and consume. The utility function for
a typical individual, denoted by u(·), depends on its consumption in the 2nd period
only. I make the standard assumptions: u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0.
2. Collateralized loans
Loans are all initiated in the 1st period and mature in the 2nd period. If an individual
lends, he pays certain amount of the risk-free asset in the 1st period and is supposed
to receive a promised amount of the risk-free asset as the repayment in the 2nd period;
if the individual borrows, he receives certain amount of the risk-free asset instead and
meanwhile is required to hold certain amount of the risky asset as the collateral in
the 1st period, and in the 2nd period he is supposed to repay the promised amount
of the risk-free asset. When the loan is not repaid, the collateral is seized to pay off
the loan.
A collateralized loan is defined as a pair, (R, c), which states the promised re-
payment rate and the collateral rate. Table II gives the definition for each contract
terms.
For example, consider loan (1.2, 1.1) and suppose the notional value is 100. R =
1.2 means that 120 units of the risk-free asset needs to repaid in the 2nd period.
ck = 1.1 means the risky asset pledged as the collateral is worth 110 units of the
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Table II. Two contract terms in a loan
Variable
R the Gross Interest Rate
Formula: promised amount of the risk-free asset/ notional value
c the Collateral Rate
Formula: value of the risky asset posted as the collateral/ notional value
risk-free asset in the 1st period.
Individuals borrow and lend not in a bilateral way but in Walrasian markets.
For each loan, given its associated price, individuals submit their orders of borrowing
or lending to a Walrasian auctioneer. For example, if individuals want to borrow
or to lend under loan (1.2, 1.1), they need to tell the auctioneer how much they
want to borrow or to lend. The notional value is the number that individuals use
to communicate with the auctioneer about the quantity to borrow or to lend. If a
borrowing order is placed under loan (1.2, 1.1) of a notional value 100, the auctioneer
writes −100 in its calculation of market clearing. If a lending order is placed of a
notional value 150, the auctioneer adds +150. The market for loan (1.2, 1.1) is cleared,
when after summing up the numbers from all orders the auctioneer gets zero.
The price of a loan is the amount of the risk-free asset per notional value to pay
for those who want to lend (or to receive for those who want to borrow) in the 1st
period. For example, if the price of loan (1.2, 1.1) is 0.5 units of the risk-free asset per
notional value, and if an individual wants to lend under loan (1.2, 1.1) of a notional
value 100, he needs to pay 50 units of the risk-free asset. Formally, there is a mapping
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which associates a loan with a price,
p(R, c) : <2+ → <+ , (3.1)
p(R, c) is the price for loan (R, c). The auctioneer announces the price of a loan and
adjusts it until the market for the loan is cleared. After a market clearing price is
reached, the auctioneer collects payments from those who place a lending order and
distribute them to those who place a borrowing order in the 1st period and collects
repayments from borrowers and distribute them to lenders in the 2nd period. The
promised repayment of a loan does not necessarily coincide with the actual repayment.
Under the collateral mechanism, borrowers will repay the loan only when the collateral
is worth more than the amount due, i.e., whenever
R ≤ X
q
· c , (3.2)
the loan will be paid off, otherwise borrowers default and the collateral is seized.
Note whether or not the loan is paid off is contingent on the value of X. rl(X, q;R, c)
denotes the actual return rate for loan (R, c), and
rl(X, q;R, c) = min{R, (X
q
· c)} . (3.3)
Note rl(X, q;R, c) is continuous and homogeneous of degree one with respect to (R, c).
So is p(R, c), if certain types of arbitrage activities are allowed. Without loss of
generality, I assume individuals restrict their choices to the set of loans the price of
which is 1. Ω denotes this set,
Ω ≡ {(R, c) ∈ <2+ ‖ p(R, c) = 1} . (3.4)
Ω represents all loans available in the market.
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3. Credit default swaps
For each loan, there is a corresponding credit default swap (CDS). In the 1st period,
if an individual buys a CDS on a particular loan (R, c) of a notional value, he pays
certain amount of the risk-free asset as the premium in the 1st period; he receives
the premium if the individual sells the CDS. In the 2nd period only if loan (R, c) is
not paid off, i.e., when R > X
q
· c, the individual pays as a CDS seller (or receives
as a CDS buyer) the difference between the promised loan repayment and the value
of the collateral, i.e., R − (X
q
· c) units of the risk-free asset per notional value. The
spread of a CDS is defined as the amount of the risk-free asset per notional value to
pay for those who buy the CDS (or to receive for those who sell the CDS) in the 1st
period. Formally,
pi(R, c) : <2+ → <+ , (3.5)
pi(R, c) denotes the spread of the CDS on loan (R, c). Take the example of loan
(1.2, 1.1), and suppose q = 1, and pi(1.2, 1.1) = 0.2. If an individual buys the CDS
on loan (1.2, 1.1) of a notional value 100, the individual needs to pay 20 units of the
risk-free asset in the 1st period as the premium. If x = 2, loan (1.2, 1.1) is paid off
and the individual gets nothing in this contingency. If x = 1, loan (1.2, 1.1) is not
paid off and the individual receives 10 (= 120−110) units of the risk-free asset in the
2nd period. rs(X, q;R, c) denotes the actual return rate for the CDS on loan (R, c),
and
rs(X, q;R, c) = max{R− (X
q
· c), 0} . (3.6)
I make two assumptions on CDS trading, which have important consequences
throughout the paper. The first assumption makes sure that all credit default swaps
40
are backed by a sufficient amount of collateral so that in any contingency CDS sellers
are able to deliver promised payoffs.
Assumption 1. Sellers of credit default swaps need to post a sufficient amount of
collateral so that the promised payments made on a credit default swap will be made
in every contingency, i.e., for a credit default swap on loan (R, c), a seller needs to
hold R units of the risk-free asset per notional value in the 1st period.
The immediate consequence of this assumption is that lending under any loan
and meanwhile buying the corresponding CDS of the same notional value give a
risk-free return rate. Formally, ∀x, q, and (R, c),
rl(x, q;R, c) + rs(x, q;R, c) = R . (3.7)
Since Assumption 1 requires CDS sellers to post a sufficient amount of collateral
which might be unnecessary for certain contingencies. The second assumption allows
CDS sellers to economize on collateral: the abundant part of the collateral used for
credit default swaps can be used for corresponding loans. The rationale for the second
assumption comes from the fact that the collateral posted for the credit default swap
on loan (R, c) of a notional value 1 minus the promised payment is R−rs(X, q;R, c) =
rl(X, q;R, c), which can be used as an equivalent substitute for the risky asset as
collateral for loan (R, c).
Assumption 2. The remnant of the collateral used to back up a credit default swap
on a loan can be used as collateral for the same loan and it is viewed as an equivalent
substitute for the risky asset.
Under two assumptions above and if certain types of arbitrage activities are
allowed, the sum of the spread of a CDS and the price of the corresponding loan
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should be equal to the promised repayment rate on the loan, i.e., ∀(R, c) ∈ <2+,
pi(R, c) = R− p(R, c) . (3.8)
The implications of the equality (3.8), Assumption 1, and Assumption 2 are profound.
Several comments are in order. First, if an individual wants to lend under a loan and
buy the credit default swap on the same loan, the individual can in fact obtain the
same payoffs in all contingencies by lending less and holding some additional amount
of the risk-free asset. For example, consider lending under loan (1.05, 1.1) of a notional
value 10000 and buying the credit default swap on loan (1.05, 1.1) of a notional value
1000. Regardless of the value of x, this operation yields the same payoffs as lending
under loan (1.05, 1.1) of a notional value 9000 and meanwhile holding 1050 units of
the risk-free asset.
Second, if an individual wants to sell a CDS on a loan, the individual can obtain
an equivalent payoffs schedule by lending under the corresponding loan. This is due
to equality (3.8) and (3.7).
Third, as I examine the role that credit default swaps play as insurance only, i.e.,
to hedge default risks, the first fact that buying credit default swaps to alleviate po-
tential losses from loan defaults is equivalent with lending less and holding additional
amounts of the risk-free asset and the second fact that selling credit default swaps
is equivalent with lending under the corresponding loans, constitute the core reasons
why the introduction of credit default swaps only as insurance has neither effect on
the price of the risky asset nor the market for collateralized loans. Note these two
facts are independent of assumptions on individuals’ beliefs on X.
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4. Individual problem
Since individuals are different only by their beliefs about X, I analyze individuals’
choices in the 1st period in a generic way. I assume that a typical individual has
a subjective probability distribution regarding X and the cumulative distribution
function is denoted by F (·). The objective for a typical individual is to maximize∫
u(z)dF (x) , (3.9)
where z denotes the consumption in the 2nd period,
z = x · k + a+
∑
Ω
[
rl(x, q;R, c) · L(R, c) + rs(x, q;R, c) · S(R, c)
]
, (3.10)
where L(R, c) denotes the notional value of loan (R, c) to borrow or to lend (If
L(R, c) < 0 it denotes borrowing); S(R, c) denotes the notional value of CDS on
loan (R, c) to buy or to sell (If S(R, c) < 0 it denotes selling), subject to
q · k + a+
∑
Ω
[
1 · L(R, c) + pi(R, c) · S(R, c)] = q · k0 + a0 , (3.11)
and two collateral constraints,
−
∑
Ω
R ·min{S(R, c)} ≤ a , (3.12)
−
∑
Ω
[
c ·min{(min{L(R, c), 0} −min{S(R, c), 0}), 0}] ≤ q · k . (3.13)
Note (3.12) is due to Assumption 1, and (3.13) considers S(·) is due to Assumption 2.
To write out the Lagrange, where λ is the lagrange multiplier for (3.11), ν for (3.12),
and µ for (3.13).
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Lagrange:
u(z)
+ λ · (qk0 + a0 − q · k − a−
∑
Ω
[
L(R, c) + pi(R, c)S(R, c)
]
)
+ ν · (a+
∑
Ω
R ·min{S(R, c), 0})
+ µ · (q · k +
∑
Ω
[
c ·min{(min{L(R, c), 0} −min{S(R, c), 0}), 0}]) . (3.14)
As I have illustrated intuitively, under Assumption 1, Assumption 2, and equal-
ity 3.8, lending under a loan and meanwhile buying a CDS on the same loan of the
same notional value should be equivalent with holding the risk-free asset, and sell-
ing a CDS on a loan is equivalent with lending under the same loan. The following
lemma formalizes these results. And note this lemma holds true regardless of the
assumptions on beliefs about X.
Lemma 6. Assumption 1-2 and equality 3.8 hold. Suppose {k, a, L(·), S(·)} max-
imizes (3.9) subject to (3.11)-(3.13). If a particular loan (R0, c0) ∈ Ω such that
L(R0, c0) 6= 0 and S(R0, c0) 6= 0, and then ∃{k˜, a˜, L˜(·), S˜(·)}, which is a maximizer
too but L˜(R0, c0) · S˜(R0, c0) = 0.
By the lemma above, I can concentrate on choices by a typical individual in which
∀(R, c) ∈ <2+, L(R, c) · S(R, c) = 0. In below, I state the necessary conditions for the
degenerate case of F (·), i.e., the individual has a point estimate of X. Therefore, the
objective to maximize (3.9) is equivalent to maximize (3.10).
Lemma 7. Suppose {k, a, L(·), S(·)} maximizes (3.10) subject to (3.11)-(3.13), and
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∀(R, c) ∈ <2+, L(R, c) · S(R, c) = 0. The conditions in below must be satisfied.
x− λ · q + µ · q ≤ 0 , (3.15)
where the equality holds if k > 0;
1− λ+ ν ≤ 0 , (3.16)
where the equality holds if a > 0; ∀(R, c) ∈ Ω, if L(R, c) 6= 0, S(R, c) = 0,
rl(x, q;R, c)− λ+ µ · c · 1{L(R, c) < 0} = 0 , (3.17)
rs(x, q;R, c)− pi · λ ≤ 0 , (3.18)
rs(x, q;R, c)− pi · λ+ ν ·R− µ · c · 1{L(R, c) < 0} ≥ 0 , (3.19)
if L(R, c) = 0, S(R, c) 6= 0,
rl(x, q;R, c)− λ ≤ 0 , (3.20)
rl(x, q;R, c)− λ+ µ · c · 1{S(R, c) > 0} ≥ 0 , (3.21)
rs(x, q;R, c)− pi · λ+ ν ·R · 1{S(R, c) < 0} = 0 , (3.22)
if L(R, c) = 0, S(R, c) = 0,
rl(x, q;R, c)− λ ≤ 0 , (3.23)
rl(x, q;R, c)− λ+ µ · c ≥ 0 , (3.24)
rs(x, q;R, c)− pi · λ ≤ 0 , (3.25)
rs(x, q;R, c)− pi · λ+ ν ·R ≥ 0 . (3.26)
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B. Equilibrium
An equilibrium is defined as a state in which given p(·) and q all markets are cleared in
the 1st period. In below, I first examine the effect of introducing credit default swaps
only as insurance. The following result does not depend on how individuals’ beliefs
about X are specified. To restrict the uses of credit default swaps to insurance only,
the possibility of buying credit default swaps with no investment in the corresponding
loans must be excluded. The following assumption states this restriction formally.
Assumption 3. It is not allowed to purchase credit default swaps on any loan of
a notional value exceeding the actual holding of this loan. Precisely, ∀(R, c) ∈ <2+,
L(R, c) ≥ S(R, c) provided S(R, c) > 0.
I show that the introduction of credit default swaps only as insurance has no effect
on the price of the risky asset and the market for collateralized loans in equilibrium.
As I have mentioned earlier, the core reasons for the zero-effect result stem from two
facts: under Assumption 1-2 and equality 3.8, first buying credit default swaps to
alleviate potential losses from loan defaults is equivalent with lending less and holding
additional amounts of the risk-free asset, and second selling credit default swaps is
equivalent with lending under the corresponding loans. The following theorem states
the result formally.
Theorem 5. Under Assumption 1-2 and equality 3.8, if {q∗, p∗(·)} is an equilibrium
when credit default swaps are not allowed, it must be an equilibrium when credit default
swaps are allowed but the uses of them are restricted under Assumption 3, vise versa.
The theorem above deals with the effect of introducing credit default swaps only
as insurance. In below, I assume that credit default swaps not only can be used to
hedge default risks but also to bet against loans collateralized by the risky asset.
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Moreover, I make a concrete specification of individuals’ beliefs about X. Precisely,
I assume that the economy is divided by two groups: “optimists” and “pessimists”,
both of which have a point estimate of X, as Table III illustrates. I use the notations
in Table IV to differentiate variables associated with two separate groups.
Table III. Specification of beliefs
groups point estimate of X population
optimists xh 1− θ
pessimists xl θ
Table IV. Notations
variable optimists pessimists
a: ao ap
k: ko kp
L(·): Lo(·) Lp(·)
S(·): So(·) Sp(·)
λ: λo λp
µ: µo µp
ν: νo νp
When both collateralized loans and credit default swaps are not allowed, in the
1st period there are only two assets, the risky and risk-free asset. It is easy to derive
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the equilibrium value for q in this case.
q = 1−θ
θ
· a0
k0
, if
a0
k0
xh+
a0
k0
< θ <
a0
k0
xl+
a0
k0
;
q = xl , if θ ≥
a0
k0
xl+
a0
k0
;
q = xh , if θ ≤
a0
k0
xh+
a0
k0
.
(3.27)
From this point on, I assume that loans collateralized by the risky asset are always
allowed, and I solve for {q, p(·)} in equilibrium analytically when credit default swaps
are banned and are allowed respectively, and then compare the differences. Before
heading forward, I provide a result, useful later and independent of whether or not
credit default swaps are allowed. The following lemma states that the price of the
risky asset should lie in between two polars of opinion among individuals.
Lemma 8. In equilibrium, when collateralized loans are allowed, regardless of whether
or not trading credit default swaps is allowed, the price of the risky asset, q ∈ [xl, xh].
Proof. Step1: suppose q > xh. ∃ an individual in the economy who holds the risky
asset. q > xh implies that he must borrow under some loan (R, c) ∈ Ω. To make the
loan (R, c) attractive, it must be c > 1, which in turn implies no one in the economy
wants to borrow under the loan (R, c). Step2: suppose q < xl. ∃ an individual in
the economy who holds the risk-free asset. q < xl implies that he must sell a CDS
on a loan (R, c) ∈ Ω and thus min{R, xl
q
c} > 1, which implies no one in the economy
wants to buy CDS on the loan (R, c).
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1. Without credit default swaps
To solve for {q, p(·)}, first I derive the equilibrium conditions on q and Ω, given
how individuals transact collateralized loans. There are only three cases: no loan
transaction at all, pessimists borrowing from optimists, or optimists borrowing from
pessimists.
Lemma 9. When trading credit default swaps is not allowed, if in equilibrium there
is no loan transaction among individuals, it must be that
Ω = {(R, c)‖rl(xh, q;R, c) = 1} , (3.28)
and q = xh ≤ 1−θθ a0k0 .
Proof. Optimists must hold non-zero risky asset. Since there is no borrowing and
lending, µo = 0. Hence Ω = {(R, c)‖rl(xh, q;R, c) = xhq }. Since rl(xl, q; xhq , xhxl ) =
xh
q
,
it must be that xh
q
= 1, otherwise no one holds the risk-free asset. When q = xh,
pessimists must hold zero risky asset. Hence the market clearing condition requires
that qk0 + a0 ≥ q k01−θ , which implies xh ≤ 1−θθ a0k0 .
Lemma 10. When trading credit default swaps is not allowed, if in equilibrium pes-
simists borrow from optimists under some loan (R, c) ∈ Ω, it must be that c = 1,
R ≥ 1, q = xh, and Ω satisfies (3.28).
Proof. Suppose optimists lend to pessimists under loan (R, c) ∈ Ω. It must be that,
rl(xh, q;R, c) ≥ max{1, xhq }. Step1: R < xlq c. It must be that R = 1 and q = xl. But
meanwhile, rl(xh, q;R, c) = R = 1 ≥ xhq , and thus xl ≥ xh. Contradiction. Step2:
R ≥ xl
q
c. It must be that c = 1. Hence rl(xh, q;R, c) = λ
o = xh
q
, which implies µo = 0
and R ≥ xh
q
. Hence Ω = {(R, c)‖rl(xh, q;R, c) = xhq }. Since rl(xl, q; xhq , xhxl ) =
xh
q
, it
must be that xh
q
= 1, otherwise no one holds the risk-free asset.
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Lemma 11. When credit default swaps are not allowed, if in equilibrium optimists
borrow from pessimists under loan (R, c) ∈ Ω, it must be that rl(xl, q;R, c) = 1 and
1 = R ≤ xl
q
c. Either µo = 0, q = xh, and Ω satisfies (3.28) or µ
o > 0, q < xh,
R = xl
q
c, and Ω is not unique and a possible solution is:
Ω = {(R, c)‖R > xh
q
, c = 1} ∪ {(R, c)‖R = 1, c > q
xl
}
∪ {(R, c)‖(R, c) = β · (xh
q
, 1) + (1− β) · (1, q
xl
), β ∈ [0, 1]} . (3.29)
Proof. Suppose in the equilibrium that optimists borrow from pessimists under loan
(R, c) ∈ Ω where R > xl
q
c = 1. If R ≥ xh
q
c, it must be that c = 1, which implies q = xl
and thus for pessimists µp = 0. Hence Ω = {(R, c)‖rl(xl, q;R, c) = 1}. And thus loan
(1, 1) ∈ Ω. Optimists want to borrow to infinity under loan(1, 1). Contradiction. If
xl
q
c < R < xh
q
c, ∃ > 0 such that R−  > xl
q
c, to make pessimists indifferent between
loan (R, c) and (R − , c), p(R − , c) = 1, which implies that optimists prefer loan
(R− , c) over (R, c). Contradiction.
The following theorem presents how the equilibrium changes as θ increases. The
equilibrium price of the risky asset in general falls as θ increases, which is illustrated
in Fig. 6. When
θ ≤ xl +
a0
k0
xh +
a0
k0
, (3.30)
q = xh, the price of the risky asset reaches a level so that optimists are indifferent
between the risky and risk-free asset, indifferent between borrowing and lending for
all loans in Ω. Fig. 7 depicts Ω in this case. Since in this case the price of the risky
asset in the 1st period is so high that pessimists would not hold the risky asset. Hence
optimists as the counterpart need to absorb the entire supply of the risky asset in the
economy.
50
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
   






                          1  
	
 
  
   
	 Price
 o
f th
e
 R
isk
y
 A
sse
t 
Population of  Pessimists 
Fig. 6. q when credit default swaps are prohibited.
When
θ ≤
a0
k0
xh +
a0
k0
, (3.31)
optimists can absorb the entire supply of the risky asset without borrowing. But
when
a0
k0
xh +
a0
k0
< θ ≤ xl +
a0
k0
xh +
a0
k0
, (3.32)
optimists finance the purchase of the entire supply of the risky asset through the
collateralized loans. Moreover, in this case, optimists can still provide plenty of
collateral.
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Fig. 7. Ω when credit default swaps are prohibited and θ ≤ xl+
a0
k0
xh+
a0
k0
.
As the population of pessimists rises further, i.e., as
θ >
xl +
a0
k0
xh +
a0
k0
, (3.33)
a single individual in the optimistic crowd needs to borrow more while borrowing is
restricted by the amount of collateral, and hence the price of the risky asset and the
collateral rate have to fall. Fig. 8 depicts Ω in this case.
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.
Theorem 6. When the market for credit default swaps is not open, the equilibrium
changes as follows.
• If xh − xlθ ≤ 1−θθ a0k0 , q = xh, Ω satisfies (3.28). Moreover, if xh ≤ 1−θθ a0k0 , the
quantities of loans traded are indeterminant and it is possible there are no loan
transactions at all. If there are loan transactions, possibilities are: optimists
borrow from pessimists under loans (1, c) with c ≥ xh
xl
; pessimists borrow from
optimists under loans (R, 1) with R ≥ 1. When xh− xlθ ≤ 1−θθ a0k0 < xh, optimists
must borrow from pessimists under loans (1, c) with c ≥ xh
xl
.
• If 1−θ
θ
a0
k0
< xh − xlθ , q = xlθ + 1−θθ a0k0 , the only loan transaction is that optimists
borrow from pessimists under loan (1, q
xl
), and Ω satisfies (3.29). Moreover, if
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xl
θ
+ 1−θ
θ
a0
k0
< xl(2− xlxh ), another possible solution for Ω is:
Ω = {(R, c)‖rl(xl, q;R, c) = 1} . (3.34)
Proof. Step1: suppose xh − xlθ ≤ 1−θθ a0k0 . It must be that µo = 0. µo > 0 implies that
optimists borrow from pessimists under loan (1, q
xl
). Hence xh > q > xl. To clear
the market for the risky asset, a typical optimist should hold the risky asset k0
1−θ and
borrow a0 − θ1−θqk0. By µo > 0, it must be that 1−θθ a0k0 + xlθ = q. Hence q = xh.
Contradiction. Step2: suppose xh − xlθ > 1−θθ a0k0 . It must be that µo > 0. µo = 0
implies q = xh and
1−θ
θ
a0
k0
+ xl
θ
≤ xh. Contradiction.
One implication of the theorem above is that in general borrowing and lending
among individuals push up the price of the risky asset. Intuitively, with the aid of
loans collateralized by the risky asset, optimists can purchase the risky asset through
borrowing, which as a result lifts up the demand for the risky asset in general. But
there is one exception. As the population of pessimists is small enough, precisely,
i.e., as θ < a0/k0
xh+a0/k0
, opening up the market for collateralized loans does not alter
the equilibrium price of the risky asset. To see the point, I graph the equilibrium
price of the risky asset against the population of pessimists when both collateralized
loans are allowed and are prohibited. Fig. 9 illustrates the point for the case where
x2l + 2xl
a0
k0
< xh
a0
k0
.
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Fig. 9. q in equilibrium when collateralized loans are prohibited and are allowed.
2. With credit default swaps
To solve for {q, p(·)}, I derive the conditions on q and Ω, and how individuals pos-
sibly transact loans and credit default swaps, given the values for λo and λp. The
following lemma guarantees that a restriction on individuals’ choices does not alter
the equilibrium.
Lemma 12. Under Assumption 1-2 and equality 3.8, if {q∗, p∗(·)} is an equilibrium
when credit default swaps are allowed, it must be an equilibrium when credit default
swaps are allowed but for all individuals ∀(R, c) ∈ <2+, L(R, c) · S(R, c) = 0, vise
versa.
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The following lemma states that it is impossible that in equilibrium individuals
neither transact loans nor credit default swaps.
Lemma 13. When credit default swaps are allowed, it is impossible in equilibrium
that λo = xh
q
and λp = 1. As a result, it is impossible that individuals neither transact
loans nor credit default swaps in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose in an equilibrium, λo = xh
q
and λp = 1. By Lemma 7 µo = 0
and νp = 0. And thus ∀(R, c) ∈ Ω, rl(xh, q;R, c) = xhq and rl(xl, q;R, c) = 1.
Contradiction. Note q ∈ [xl, xh] in equilibrium by Lemma 8.
λp > 1 and λo > xh
q
imply that pessimists and optimists respectively are involved
in some businesses which can earn a higher return than holding both the risky and
risk-free asset. Note by Lemma 8, q ∈ [xl, xh] in equilibrium.
When λo = xh
q
and λp > 1, the following lemma states that Ω should be like the
one shown in Fig. 10. In this case optimists are indifferent between the loans in Ω
and the risky asset while pessimists perceive it lucrative to bet against loan (xh
q
, 1)
which they expect to go bad in the 2nd period. It is also possible in this case that
optimists borrow from pessimists under loans (xh
q
, c) with c ≥ xh
xl
and that pessimists
borrow from optimists under loans (R, 1) with R ≥ xh
q
.
Lemma 14. When credit default swaps are allowed, if in equilibrium λo = xh
q
and
λp > 1,
x2h
2xh−xl ≤ q < xh,
Ω = {(R, c)‖rl(xh; q, R, c) = xh
q
} , (3.35)
and the possible transactions are: pessimists buy from optimists the credit default swap
on loan (xh
q
, 1), optimists borrow from pessimists under loans (xh
q
, c) with c ≥ xh
xl
, and
pessimists borrow from optimists under loans (R, 1) with R ≥ xh
q
.
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Proof. λo = xh
q
implies µo = 0 and thus Ω satisfies (3.35).
x2h
2xh−xl > q implies that loan
(xh
q
, xh
xl
) ∈ Ω dominates the risk-free asset in return and that there are no transactions
of CDS. Hence no one holds the risk-free asset. Contradiction. q = xh implies the
CDS on loan (xh
q
, 1) costs nothing to buy while pessimists expect loan (xh
q
, 1) to go bad
and hence buy the corresponding CDS to infinity. Contradiction. x2h/(2xh − xl) = q
implies that for pessimists buying CDS on loan (xh
q
, 1) has the same return rate as
lending under loans (xh
q
, c) with c ≥ xh
xl
. For optimists, loans in Ω are indifferent.
Loans (R, 1) with R ≥ xh
q
are equivalent with the risky asset for optimists except
that the loans can not be used as collateral. Borrowing under loans (R, 1) with
R ≥ xh
q
is of no real substance for pessimists.
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Fig. 10. Ω when credit default swaps are allowed and λo = xh
q
, λp > 1.
When λo > xh
q
and λp = 1, the following lemma states that Ω should be like the
one shown in Fig.11. In this case pessimists are indifferent between the loans in Ω
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and the risk-free asset while optimists perceive it lucrative to buy the risky asset on
margin under loan (1, q
xl
). It is also possible that pessimists buy from optimists the
credit default swaps on loans (R, q
xl
) with R ≥ xh
xl
.
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Fig. 11. Ω when credit default swaps are allowed and λo > xh
q
, λp = 1.
Lemma 15. In equilibrium, if λo > xh
q
and λp = 1, Ω satisfies (3.34), xl < q ≤
xl(2− xlxh ), and the possible transactions are: optimists borrow from pessimists under
the loan (1, q
xl
) and pessimists buy from optimists the credit default swaps on loans
(R, q
xl
) with R ≥ xh
xl
.
Proof. λp = 1 implies νp = 0 and thus Ω satisfies (3.34). q > xl(2 − xlxh ) implies
that loan (xh
xl
, q
xl
) ∈ Ω dominates the risky asset in return and that there are no loan
transactions. Hence no one holds the risky asset. Contradiction. q = xl implies
that optimists can and are willing to borrow as much as possible. Contradiction.
q = xl(2 − xlxh ) implies that for optimists, borrowing under loan (1,
q
xl
) has the same
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return rate as selling CDS on loans (R, q
xl
) with R ≥ xh
xl
. For pessimists, buying CDS
on loans (R, q
xl
) with R ≥ xh
xl
gives the same return rate as lending under loan (1, q
xl
).
Hence it is possible pessimists buy from optimists the credit default swaps on loans
(R, q
xl
) with R ≥ xh
xl
.
When λo > xh
q
and λp > 1, the following lemma states that Ω should be like the
one shown in Fig.12. In this case pessimists perceive it profitable to buy the credit
default swap on a loan which they expect to go bad in the 2nd period while optimists
perceive it profitable to buy the risky asset on margin under a different loan.
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Fig. 12. Ω when credit default swaps are allowed and λo > xh
q
, λp > 1.
Lemma 16. In equilibrium, if λo > xh
q
and λp > 1, min{xl(2 − xlxh ),
x2h
2xh−xl} < q <
max{xl(2− xlxh ),
x2h
2xh−xl}, the only transactions are: optimists borrow from pessimists
under the loan (R1, c1) and meanwhile pessimists buy from optimists the credit default
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swaps on loan (R2, c2), where
R1 =
xl
q
c1 , (3.36)
R2 =
xh
q
c2 , (3.37)
R1 =
R2 − xlq c2
R2 − 1 > 1 , (3.38)
R2 =
xh
q
c1 −R1
c1 − 1 >
xh
q
, (3.39)
1− θ
θ
a0
k0
[1− 1
R2(1− θ) ]− (1−
1
c1θ
)q = 0 , (3.40)
and
Ω = {(R, c)|R > R2 , c = c2} ∪ {(R, c)|R = R1 , c > c1}
∪ {(R, c)|(R, c) = β · (R1, c1) + (1− β) · (R2, c2) , ∀β ∈ [0, 1]} . (3.41)
Proof. Step1: λo > xh
q
and λp > 1 imply that optimists must borrow and pessimists
must buy CDS. That optimists do not borrow under any loan implies that optimists
do not hold the risky asset. Since λp > 1, that pessimists hold the risky asset
implies that they borrow under certain loans. Suppose pessimists borrow under a
loan (R0, c0) ∈ Ω. It must be that R0 > 1 since λo > xhq ≥ 1, which implies R0 ≥ xlq c0
and thus c0 = 1. But
xl
q
≤ 1. Contradiction. Hence no one holds the risky asset.
Contradiction. That pessimists do not buy CDS on any loan implies that optimists
do not hold the risk-free asset. Since λp > 1, that pessimists hold the risk-free asset
implies that they sell CDS on certain loans. Suppose pessimists sell CDS under a
loan (R0, c0) ∈ Ω. It must be that R0 > 1 and xlq c0 > 1 since λp > 1, and
R0−xhq c0
R0−1 > 1
since λo > xh
q
≥ 1. Hence xh
q
c0 < 1 contradicting with
xl
q
c0 > 1. Therefore no one
holds the risk-free asset. Contradiction. Step2: Express R2 in q by using equations
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(3.36)-(3.39):
R2 =
(xh
xl
− 1)(1− xl
xh
)− 1
q
xl
(1− xl
xh
)− 1 .
Since R2 ∈ (xhq , xhxl ), min{xl(2 −
xl
xh
),
x2h
2xh−xl} < q < max{xl(2 −
xl
xh
),
x2h
2xh−xl}. Step3:
optimists borrow from pessimists under loan (R1, c1), it must be that R1 =
xl
q
c1;
pessimists buy from optimists CDS on loan (R2, c2), it must be that R2 =
xh
q
c2.
Step4: it is easy to check that when Ω satisfies (3.41), the only loan transaction is on
loan (R1, c1) and the only transaction of CDS is on loan (R2, c2).
The following theorem presents how the equilibrium changes as θ increases.
Fig. 13 illustrates how the price of the risky asset changes as θ increases when
credit default swaps both are prohibited and are allowed, in the case where
x2h
2xh−xl >
xl(2− xlxh ). 
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Fig. 13. q when credit default swaps are allowed and
x2h
2xh−xl > xl(2−
xl
xh
).
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Theorem 7. When trading credit default swaps is allowed, the equilibrium changes
as follows.
• If
θ >
xl +
a0
k0
xl(2− xlxh ) + a0k0
, (3.42)
q = 1−θ
θ
a0
k0
+ xl
θ
, optimists borrow from pessimists under the loan (1, q
xl
), there is
no transaction in the market for credit default swaps, and Ω satisfies (3.34).
• If
xl +
a0
k0
(1− xl
xh
)
xl(2− xlxh ) + a0k0
≤ θ ≤ xl +
a0
k0
xl(2− xlxh ) + a0k0
, (3.43)
q = xl(2− xlxh ), optimists borrow from pessimists under the loan (1,
q
xl
), pessimists
buy from optimists the credit default swaps on loans (R, q
xl
) with R ≥ xh
xl
, and
Ω satisfies (3.34).
• If
θ <
a0
k0
(1− xl
xh
)
xh +
a0
k0
(2− xl
xh
)
, (3.44)
q = (1−θ)a0xh
xhθk0+a0
, pessimists buy from optimists the credit default swaps on loan
(xh
q
, 1), there is no loan transaction, and Ω satisfies (3.35).
• If
a0
k0
(1− xl
xh
)
xh +
a0
k0
(2− xl
xh
)
≤ θ ≤ xl +
a0
k0
(1− xl
xh
)
xh +
a0
k0
(2− xl
xh
)
, (3.45)
q =
x2h
2xh−xl , pessimists buy from optimists the credit default swaps on loan (
xh
q
, 1),
optimists borrow from pessimists under loans (xh
q
, c) with c ≥ xh
xl
, and Ω satisfies
(3.35).
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• If
xl +
a0
k0
(1− xl
xh
)
xh +
a0
k0
(2− xl
xh
)
< θ <
xl +
a0
k0
(1− xl
xh
)
xl(2− xlxh ) + a0k0
, (3.46)
optimists borrow from pessimists under loan (R1, c1), pessimists buy from opti-
mists the credit default swaps on loan (R2, c2), such that (3.36)-(3.40) hold, and
Ω satisfies (3.41).
Two implications from the theorem deserve to be mentioned. First, as credit
default swaps are introduced, the price of the risky asset falls in general. The intuitive
reason is that pessimists use credit default swaps to bet against some loans backed by
the risky asset. Pessimists believe the return from the risky asset to be low and hence
they expect some loans to go bad for sure in the 2nd period. Meanwhile, optimists
believe the return from the risky asset to be high and hence that these loans will be
paid off. Selling the credit default swaps requires optimists to hold certain amount
of the risk-free asset as the collateral, and as long as the spreads of the credit default
swaps are high, optimists are directed from buying the risky asset on margin to selling
the credit default swaps, which as a result dampens the demand for the risky asset
in general.
Second, it is not always the case that the price of the risky asset falls as credit
default swaps are introduced. When the population of pessimists is large enough, the
introduction of credit default swaps in fact does nothing to the price of the risky asset
and the market for collateralized loans. As Fig. 13 illustrates, this is when (3.42)
holds. In this case, before credit default swaps are introduced, optimists perceive
sizable profits of buying the risky asset on margin. After credit default swaps are
introduced, no transactions of credit default swaps take place in equilibrium. This
is not because there is a lack of incentive on the side of CDS buyers, but because
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optimists perceive that the return rate of buying the risky asset on margin dominates
that of selling the credit default swaps and hence there is a lack of incentive on the
side of CDS sellers. As in Fig. 11, pessimists perceive that the return rate of buying
the credit default swap on loan (xh
xl
, q
xl
) is 1, which is equal to that of lending under
loan (1, q
xl
), while optimists perceive that the return rate of selling the credit default
swap on loan (xh
xl
, q
xl
) is xh
xl
, which is less than the return rate of buying the risky asset
on margin under loan (1, q
xl
).
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
In the present study, I postulate that economic agents have heterogeneous beliefs,
and I theoretically analyze collateralized loan transactions among economic agents
arising from the different beliefs. And I make collateral requirements endogenously
determined. Below, I discuss possible extensions for the two works.
A. Speculative currency crises
I show that loan transactions among domestic residents arising from heterogeneous
beliefs make an exchange rate peg vulnerable even though heterogeneous beliefs per
se bring stability. This result has an immediate policy implication: the central bank
should try to curb private transactions which destabilize the system. Nevertheless, it
is not obvious what instruments that the central bank should use to accomplish this
goal.
An interest rate defense is a policy measure, which is often mentioned among
policy-makers. It says that central banks should raise interest rates to fend off spec-
ulative attacks. The idea is that high interest rates discourage short sales against
domestic money. Since in the standard models of currency crises the private sector
is a homogeneous entity, if some one wants to sell domestic money short, no one
willingly takes the counterpart position. In my model, due to heterogeneous beliefs,
some domestic residents sell domestic money short and others willingly lend. Hence
I am able to use the framework in the present study to examine the conventional
wisdom on an interest rate defense.
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B. Credit default swaps
I show that credit default swaps only as insurance have no effect on asset prices. The
key assumption is that a sufficient amount of collateral must be posted to back up
the promise made in a credit default swap so that the seller of the credit default swap
would be able to deliver payoffs in all contingencies. This is obviously counter-factual
in the light of the case of AIG. To relax this assumption and see how the equilibrium
changes is a main direction to explore.
66
REFERENCES
Barro, R. (1976): “The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest,” Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 8(4), 439–456.
Broner, F. (2008): “Discrete Devaluations and Multiple Equilibria in a First Gener-
ation Model of Currency Crises,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(3), 592–605.
Che, Y., and R. Sethi (2011): “Credit Derivatives and the Cost of Capital,”
Unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, New York.
Flood, R., and P. Garber (1984): “Collapsing Exchange-Rate Regimes: Some
Linear Examples,” Journal of International Economics, 17(1-2), 1–13.
Geanakoplos, J. (1997): “Promises Promises,” in The Economy as an Evolving
Complex System II, ed. by W. B. Arthur, S. N. Durlauf, and D. A. Lane. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 285–320.
(2003): “Liquidity, Default, and Crashes Endogenous Contracts in General
Equilibrium,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applica-
tions, Eighth World Conference, Vol. II, ed. by M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen, and
S. J. Turnovsky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 170–205.
(2010): “The Leverage Cycle,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Vol.
XXIV, ed. by D. Acemoglu, K. Rogoff, and M. Woodford. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1–65.
Hart, O. (1974): “On the Existence of Equilibrium in a Securities Model,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 9(3), 293–311.
67
Krugman, P. (1979): “A Model of Balance-Of-Payments Crises,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 11(3), 311–325.
Lewis, M. (2010): The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine. New York: W.W.
Norton & Company.
Milne, F. (1980): “Short-Selling, Default Risk and the Existence of Equilibrium in
a Securities Model,” International Economic Review, 21(2), 255–267.
Morris, S., and H. Shin (1998): “Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling
Currency Attacks,” American Economic Review, 88(3), 587–597.
Obstfeld, M. (1986): “Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance-Of-Payments Crises,”
American Economic Review, 76(1), 72–81.
Stulz, R. (2010): “Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 24(1), 73–92.
Valev, N., and J. Carlson (2008): “Fixed Exchange Rate Credibility with
Heterogeneous Expectations,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 30(4), 1712–1722.
68
APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose in an equilibrium domestic residents θx ≤ f gt borrow from domestic
residents θx > f
g
t at date t under the loan (R, cf , cm) ∈ Ωt. Step1: If cm = 0, it must
be that cf = 1 and R ≥ 1+i∗1−p¯i . Since r(0;R, cf , cm) ≥ r(p¯i;R, cf , cm)(1− p¯i) ≥ (1 + i∗),
cf > 1 implies r(0;R, cf , cm) = 1 + i
∗ and r(p¯i;R, cf , cm)(1 − p¯i) = 1 + i∗, which in
combination, implies R = 1+i
∗
1−p¯i and R = 1 + i
∗. Contradiction. Step2: If cm > 0,
cf > 0, and R < cf (1 + i
∗) + cm, r(0;R, cf , cm) > r(p¯i;R, cf , cm)(1 − p¯i) ≥ (1 +
i∗). Hence for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt , µft > 0. As a result, this case can not
happen in the equilibrium, intuitively because domestic residents θ ≤ f gt as borrowers
have incentives to ask domestic residents θx > f
g
t as lenders to lower the collateral
requirements. Precisely, ∃ > 0, such that R < (cf − )(1 + i∗) + cm. To make
domestic residents θx ≤ f gt not prefer loan (R, cf − , cm) over (R, cf , cm) ∈ Ωt in
borrowing, it must be that pt(R, cf − , cm) < 1 due to the fact that for domestic
residents θx ≤ f gt , µft > 0. But domestic residents θx > f gt prefer (R, cf − , cm) over
(R, cf , cm) in lending provided p(R, cf − , cm) < 1 due to the fact that r(p¯i;R, cf −
, cm)(1− p¯i) = r(p¯i;R, cf , cm)(1− p¯i). Contradiction. Step3: The case cm > 0, cf ≥ 0,
R ≥ cf (1+i∗)+cm but R(1−p¯i) < cf (1+i∗)+cm(1−p¯i) can not happen in equilibrium
as well, for the same reason as in Step2, i.e., intuitively because domestic residents
θx ≤ f gt as borrowers have incentives to ask domestic residents θx > f gt as lenders
to lower the collateral requirements. Step4: The case cm > 0, cf > 0, R(1 − p¯i) ≥
cf (1+i
∗)+cm(1− p¯i) can happen in the equilibrium only when cf (1+i∗)+cm(1− p¯i) =
1 + i∗ and thus R ≥ 1+i∗
1−p¯i . When cm > 0 and cf > 0, it must be that for domestic
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residents θx ≤ f gt , λtλt−l′(mt) = 1+i
∗
1−p¯i and λt =
l′(mt)cm
cm+cf−1 , which in combination implies
cf (1+i
∗)+cm(1−p¯i) = 1+i∗. Hence for domestic residents θx > f gt , λt = 1. Moreover,
for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt , λt = 11−p¯i . If for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt , λt > 11−p¯i ,
they do not lend to domestic residents θx > f
g
t , which implies domestic residents θx ≤
f gt hold more domestic money than what is given by l
′(mt) > i
∗
1+i∗ . Contradiction.
Step5: The case cm > 0, cf = 0, and R < cm can happen in equilibrium provided
for borrowers µmt = 0. As a result, for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt , λt = R1+i∗ and
R ≥ 1+i∗
1−p¯i . R >
1+i∗
1−p¯i implies that for domestic residents θx > f
g
t , λt = R
1−p¯i
1+i∗ > 1.
Domestic residents θx ≤ f gt do not lend under loans the return of which in the
contingency of no collapse is less than R. Suppose ∃ some loan (R˜, c˜f , c˜m) ∈ Ωt
such that r(0; R˜, c˜f , c˜m) ≥ R. To domestic residents θx > f gt want to borrow under
(R˜, c˜f , c˜m), it must be that r(p¯i; R˜, c˜f , c˜m)(1 − p¯i) = R(1 − p¯i), which further implies
c˜f = 0 and domestic residents θx > f
g
t , µ
m
t = 0. The aggregate real cash balances at
date t is K(f gt )L(R−1)+(1−K(f gt ))L(i∗+ p¯i) < K(f gt )L(i∗)+(1−K(f gt ))L(i∗+ p¯i),
which contradicts with the fact the public as a whole do not hold the foreign bond
and do not consume at date t. Step6: When cm > 0, cf = 0, and R ≥ cm it must
be that cm =
1+i∗
1−p¯i . If cm >
1+i∗
1−p¯i , since for domestic residents θ ≤ f gt , l′(mt) ≥ cm−11+i∗ ,
and then for domestic residents θx ≤ f gt , λt > 11−p¯i . Contradiction as the same as in
Step5.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Step1: The case R > cf (1+i
∗)+cm and cf > 0 can not happen in equilibrium,
intuitively because domestic residents θx > f
g
t as borrowers have incentives to ask
domestic residents θx ≤ f gt as lenders to lower the promised interest rate. Formally,
∃ > 0 such that R−  > cf (1 + i∗) + cm and (R− )(1− p¯i) < cf (1 + i∗) + cm(1− p¯i)
provided cf > 0. To make domestic residents θx > f
g
t not prefer loan (R − , cf , cm)
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over loan (R, cf , cm) ∈ Ωt in borrowing, pt(R− , cf , cm) < 1. But domestic residents
θx ≤ f gt prefer loan (R− , cf , cm) over loan (R, cf , cm) provided pt(R− , cf , cm) < 1.
Contradiction. Step2: The case that for domestic residents θx > f
g
t , µ
f
t > 0 and
µmt = 0 can not happen in equilibrium. If R ≤ cf (1 + i∗) + cm, cf = 0 due to
µft > 0 and µ
m
t = 0. If domestic residents θx > f
g
t hold the foreign bond, they
must borrow under some loan (R˜, c˜f , c˜m) ∈ Ωt where c˜f > 0, which is impossible
by Step1. Hence domestic residents θx > f
g
t do not hold the foreign bond, do not
consume, and moreover do not lend due to µft > 0 by Lemma 3 and thus λt > 1,
which contradicts with the fact that for domestic residents θx > f
g
t , l
′(mt) > i
∗+pi
1+i∗ .
Step3: The case that for domestic residents θx > f
g
t , µ
f
t = 0 and µ
m
t > 0 can not
happen in equilibrium. If R ≤ cf (1 + i∗) + cm, cm = 0 due to µft = 0 and µmt > 0.
Hence domestic residents θx > f
g
t must borrow under some loan (R˜, 0, c˜m) ∈ Ωt, where
R˜ > c˜m by Step1. For domestic residents θx > f
g
t , λ = 1 and thus c˜m <
1+i∗
1−p¯i due to
µm > 0. Since (
1+i∗
1−p¯i ,
1
1−p¯i , 0) ∈ Ωt, the loan (R˜, 0, c˜m) are not preferred by domestic
residents θx ≤ f gt . Step4: In the case that for domestic residents θx > f gt , µft = 0 and
µmt = 0, either
1+i∗
1−p¯i = R ≤ cf (1 + i∗) + cm, or cf = 0 and R > cm = 1+i
∗
1−p¯i . Step5: In
the case for domestic residents θx > f
g
t , µ
f
t , µ
m
t > 0, either R = cf (1 + i
∗) + cm, or
cf = 0 and R > cm. When R = cf (1 + i
∗) + cm, if cf , cm > 0, and then for domestic
residents θx > f
g
t , µ
f
t = µ
m
t (1 + i
∗) and R < 1+i
∗
1−pi . When R = cf (1 + i
∗) + cm, if
cf > 0 but cm = 0, and then cf <
1
1−p¯i and R <
1+i∗
1−p¯i . When cf = 0 and R ≥ cm,
domestic residents θx > f
g
t do hold the foreign bond and thus must borrow under
some loan (R˜, c˜f , c˜m) ∈ Ωt such that R˜ = c˜f (1 + i∗) + c˜m and c˜f > 0. As a result,
cm = R˜ <
1+i∗
1−p¯i . When R = cf (1 + i
∗) and cm = 0, for domestic residents θx > f
g
t ,
µft = µ
m
t (1 + i
∗). Suppose µft < µ
m
t (1 + i
∗). Domestic residents θx > f
g
t must borrow
under some loan (R˜, 0, c˜m) ∈ Ω where R˜ ≥ c˜m = R = cf (1 + i∗), which contradicts
with µft < µ
m
t (1 + i
∗).
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Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Let L˜(·)|Ω∼(R0,c0) = L(·)|Ω∼(R0,c0), and S˜(·)|Ω∼(R0,c0) = S(·)|Ω∼(R0,c0). Step1:
L(R0, c0) > 0 and S(R0, c0) > 0. Let L˜(R0, c0) = max{L(R0, c0) − S(R0, c0), 0},
S˜(R0, c0) = max{S(R0, c0)−L(R0, c0), 0}, k˜ = k, and a˜ = a+R0·min{S(R0, c0), L(R0, c0)}.
{k˜, a˜, L˜(·), S˜(·)} is feasible and generates the same amount of consumption good in
the 2nd period as {k, a, L(·), S(·)} for any given value of x. Step2: L(R0, c0) > 0
and S(R0, c0) < 0. Let L˜(R0, c0) = L(R0, c0) − S(R0, c0), S˜(R0, c0) = 0, k˜ = k,
and a˜ = a + R0S(R0, c0). Step3: L(R0, c0) < 0 and S(R0, c0) < 0. Let L˜(R0, c0) =
min{L(R0, c0) − S(R0, c0), 0}, S˜(R0, c0) = min{S(R0, c0) − L(R0, c0), 0}, k˜ = k, and
a˜ = a+R0 ·max{S(R0, c0), L(R0, c0)}. Step4: L(R0, c0) < 0 and S(R0, c0) > 0. Sup-
pose R0 >
x
q
c0. L(R0, c0) < 0 implies c0 = 1. Let L˜(R0, c0) = 0, S˜(R0, c0) = S(R0, c0),
qk˜ = qk+L(R0, c0) and a˜ = a. Suppose R0 ≤ xq c0. S(R0, c0) > 0 implies R0 = 1. Let
L˜(R0, c0) = L(R0, c0), S˜(R0, c0) = 0, k˜ = k and a˜ = a.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. One direction: suppose {q∗, p∗(·)} is an equilibrium when credit default swaps
are not allowed and {ki, ai, Li(·), 0} denotes the corresponding choice by individual
i ∈ [0, 1] in the equilibrium. The claim is sufficient to prove this direction that when
the price of the risky asset is q∗, the price system for the collateralized loans is p∗(·),
and credit default swaps are allowed but the uses of them are restricted under As-
sumption 3, for individual i, {ki, ai, Li(·), 0} maximizes (3.9) subject to (3.11)-(3.13).
Prove by contradiction. Suppose ∃{k˜i, a˜i, L˜i(·), S˜i(·)} which gives more consump-
tion good in the 2nd period than {ki, ai, Li(·), 0}. Due to the proof in Lemma 6,
let ∀(R, c), p∗(R, c) = 1, S˜i(R, c) = 0. Contradiction. The opposite direction: sup-
pose {q∗, p∗(·)} is an equilibrium when credit default swaps are allowed but the uses
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of them are restricted under Assumption 3 and {ki, ai, Li(·), Si(·)} denotes the cor-
responding choice by individual i ∈ [0, 1] in the equilibrium. Due to the proof in
Lemma 6, I transform all individuals’ choices by zeroing the transactions of CDS,
i.e., ∃{k˜i, a˜i, L˜i(·), S˜i(·)} which is a maximizer too. And ∀(R, c), p∗(R, c) = 1, k˜i = ki,
a˜i = ai+R ·Si(R, c), L˜i(R, c) = Li(R, c)−Si(R, c), S˜i(R, c) = 0. I show that after the
transformations, all markets are cleared, i.e.,∀(R, c), p∗(R, c) = 1, ∫ 1
0
L˜i(R, c)di = 0,
and
∫ 1
0
a˜i di =
∫ 1
0
ai di = a0.
Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. Step1: when λo > xh
q
and λp = 1,
θ ≥ xl +
a0
k0
(1− xl
xh
)
xl(2− xlxh ) + a0k0
. (A.1)
Step2: when λo = xh
q
and λp > 1,
θ ≤ xl +
a0
k0
(1− xl
xh
)
xh +
a0
k0
(2− xl
xh
)
. (A.2)
Step3: when λo > xh
q
and λp > 1 and
x2h
2xh−xl > xl(2 −
xl
xh
), R2 is decreasing in
q, and thus the left hand side of equation (3.40) is decreasing in q for any θ and
is always decreasing in θ for any q. For θ satisfying (A.2), equation (3.40) holds
provided q >
x2h
2xh−xl . Contradiction. For θ satisfying (A.1), equation (3.40) holds
provided q < xl(2 − xlxh ). Contradiction. Hence (3.46) holds. Step4: when λo >
xh
q
and λp > 1 and
x2h
2xh−xl = xl(2−
xl
xh
), q = xl(2− xlxh ). For θ satisfying (A.2), equation
(3.40) holds provided R2 <
xh
q
. Contradiction. Forθ satisfying (A.1), equation (3.40)
holds provided R2 >
xh
xl
. Contradiction. Hence (3.46) holds. Step5: when λo > xh
q
and λp > 1 and
x2h
2xh−xl < xl(2 −
xl
xh
), the left hand side of equation (3.40) is always
monotonic in q given θ and is always decreasing in θ. For θ satisfying (A.2), if the
left hand side of equation (3.40) is decreasing in q, equation (3.40) holds provided
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q > xl(2− xlxh ); if the left hand side of equation (3.40) is increasing in q, equation (3.40)
holds provided q <
x2h
2xh−xl . Contradiction. For θ satisfying (A.1), if the left hand side
of equation (3.40) is decreasing in q, equation (3.40) holds provided q <
x2h
2xh−xl ; if
the left hand side of equation (3.40) is increasing in q, equation (3.40) holds provided
q > xl(2− xlxh ). Contradiction.
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